Darwinismo

Hull 1986 - Darwinism as a historical entity

• Apresenta o caos definicional. 773-5
• Teorias evoluem como espéices. Vairação é imprenscindível a não ser em ideologias e programas mortos. 776
• Se variam, permitem contradições. 777
• Não pode haver "essencia" do darwinismo portanto 778
• In conceptual development, unreceived messages do not count. 778 This list of Darwin's precursors is as endless as it is irrelevant 779
• Historicidade das toerias em Laudan, Lakatos, Kuhn e outros... 779
• Narra a queda do pensamento tipológico 781-2
• ... e suas consequências:
• If scientific communities are also viewed as historical entities, then the rule becomes, pick a scientist, any scientist, and follow out his social relations. In doing so, one will discover a variety of groups of varying degrees of inclusiveness and discreteness. ... 
• Similarly, if conceptual systems are to be viewed as historical entities, then the rule becomes, pick a particular instance of a concept, any instance, and follow out its conceptual relations. ... 
• The peculiar thing about conceptual systems as historical entities is that they can contain at one stage a particular proposition, at another stage its negation. To make matters worse, at a particular point in time, a conceptual system can contain contradictory propositions — both a statement and its negation. Conversely, even though one proposition follows deductively from another in a conceptual system, it does not follow that this deductive consequence belongs in this conceptual system. If no one saw the connection, it does not. ... 
• The choice of a central node makes things easier, but when one first studies an historical entity, one has no way of knowing which nodes will turn out to be central and which peripheral. Whether a node is central or peripheral, however, it can still function as an exemplar. ... 
• One final characteristic of historical entities is that they can be recognized only in retrospect. ... every once in a while a new species becomes established. This species itself may eventually go extinct without leaving issue, or it may bud off numerous descendant species. There is no way to tell in advance. 783-4
• The activity is largely descriptive. In no instance can I say what must happen or could not happen. In point of fact, the Lamarckian element in Darwinism was gradually eliminated until anyone who thought that Lamarckian inheritance played a role in evolution was considered a non-Darwinian. Could anyone have predicted this course of events? No, historical entities are not that sort of thing. Trajectories resulting from Markovian processes can be plotted, their next position in phase space can be inferred with reasonable certainty, but their overall path cannot be predicted. Intellectual justice is also not relevant. Even though Lamarck did not claim that an organism's "wishful thinking" could produce heritable change in its physical make-up, that was how later workers interpreted him. What did Lamarck really say? As H. G. Cannon discovered (1957, 1959), no one but historians care. 801
• Segmentação por crenças comuns não funciona. Alternativa é tratar por compartilhamento de crenças (grupos politípicos ou politéticos). Mas não funciona com diferenças mais discretas. 784-5
• Hull: Darwinism as social group > grupo unido por laços cooperativos. É mais fácil discernir a comunidaede do que a rede conceitual, assim o primeiro pode iluminar o segundo. 785-6
• Equilíbrio intelectual social 786
• Defende que qualquer um dos darwinistas pode ser tipo 786-7 [interessante para a tese]
• In this section on the Darwinians, I have concentrated too exclusively on Darwin. Although Darwin was an extremely important Darwinian, he was not as important as the emphasis in this paper would rightly lead a reader to infer. In order to get a more balanced view, the story needs to be retold using first Hooker as the point of entry into the Darwinians, then Huxley, then Lyell, etc. By the time the structure of the Darwinians as a social group has been delineated, with three or four different figures as the focus for the relevant social relations, the outlines of the Darwinians as a historical entity are clear enough. 799
• Fala das fases de descoberta, desenvolvimento, disseminação e dogma, tal qual espécies, e do papel da crítica construtiva e do isolamento. Narra a formação dos laços de Darwin com seus amigos mais próximos. Conclui: 
• the rapid emergence of such a group was extremely helpful to Darwin, and the members of this group did not agree with each other about evolution even on fundamentals. 795
• Sobre crítica:
• The content of disagreements surely matters in science, but the style also makes a difference. That one disagrees with one's colleagues is less important than how one disagrees. Private disagreement is always more acceptable than public disagreement. 797
• Sobre consenso:
• scientists believe that there is an essence to their research program and that everyone working in it agrees over these essentials. Any attempt to make explicit the fundamental disagreements that actually divide them is met with extreme hostility. A belief in consensus seems to be necessary even when it is illusory 798
• Influencia
• Darwin scholars have been firm in insisting that reference to unappreciated precursors has no place in the history of Darwinism. Actual influence is necessary in the filiation of ideas. As Ruse has argued (1979a), the real "precursors" of Darwin were not authors who may or may not have held ideas similar to those enunciated by Darwin, but those workers who actually influenced him even if they themselves believed that species were immutable. 800
• Manir faz um estudo de influencia baseado em referências mostrando que ideias filosóficas eram muito presentes. Também considera influencia negativa 802-3
• Estudos de caso: lamarckismo, gradualismo e árvore em Darwin.
• People were not interested in what Mendel [ou Darwin] really said, but in the use they could make of him. 807
• Conclusões
• Historical entities are essentially non-essentialistic. At any one time in a conceptual historical entity, no one tenet may be essential. As they are followed through time, the importance of various tenets changes. Early on, gradualism was central to the Darwinian research program, primarily because of Darwin's strong partiality to this view. As a result of attacks, first by the Mendelians and later by the anti-Mendelian Goldschmidt, the gradualistic position hardened even while Simpson and Mayr were presenting less than perfectly gradualistic models. Later, when Eldredge and Gould presented their punctuational model, they vacillated on whether it was supposed to be a modification of earlier Darwinian models such as Mayr's founder principle or a non-Darwinian alternative. The fate of the Eldredge and Gould model has yet to be determined. It seems likely at this stage that the model will be considered a form of Darwinism whether it is accepted in its present form, or in a highly modified form, or whether it is rejected. Although a few gestures have been made toward rehabilitating Goldschmidt, the current trend is to subdivide the Simpson-Mayr school into two different strands and trace more saltative views back to Mayr (Bush 1975; Gould 1980a, 1980b, 1982; Stanley 1979). Simpson has been selected as the arch gradualist while Mayr has been cast as the prophetic type, no matter that Mayr was one of Goldschmidt's sternest critics. 
• All the disputes in the recent literature about the "essence of Darwinism" are not misdirected antiquarianism but the latest efforts of scientists to establish the boundaries of their research program, both for the recent past and for the immediate future. Because different workers hold different views and have developed these views along historically different trajectories, they see the issues differently. The individuation of research programs is a creative process: scientists are doing it as they proceed. That scientists see their own development the way that they do, mistaken or not, influences that very development. The scientists engaged in the ongoing process are not entirely unbiased in their perceptions. Scientific evolution is hardly less opportunistic than biological evolution (C. D. Darlington 1959). The task of the intellectual historian is to discern as accurately as possible the actual constitution of conceptual historical entities. 810 

Mayr 1991 - What is darwinism?

• Cunhado por Huxley em 1860, 1862, 1864 (p 567). Nunca houve consenso. Respondiam mais aos pontos que mais chamavam sua atenção.
• "What these writer failed to grqasp is that Darwinism is not a monolithic theory that rises or falls depending on the validity or invalidity of a single idea" 90
• Darwin era um tanto monolítico, mas a intercambialidade de suas teorias (descendencia comum e seleção natural, por exemplo) ficou evidente na recepção 90
• Mayr dá muito valor a multiplicidade teórica de darwin 90
• How Darwiniss is seen depends to a large extent on the background and the interests of the viewer. The word has a different meaning for a theologia, a lamarckian, a mendelian, or a post-sybnhesis evolutionary biologist. Another dimension that contributes to the diversity of opinion about the meaning of Darwinism is geography: the word "Darwinism" has meant something different in England, in Germany, in Russia, and in France. From the beginning, as we have seen, Darwin's theories were in oppsition rto a number o fideologies such as essentialism, physicalism, natural tehology, and finalims whose strenght varied from one contry to the next. For the supporters of one or the orther of these ideologies, the word "Darwinism" stood for the opposite of their own beliefs.
• An equally great diversity exists in the time dimension. ... What was called Darwinism in 1859 was no longer considered so thirty years laer, because the term has been transferred t something very different from that wich it designated at the eartlier period. 91
• Different components of Darwin's paradigm were particularly interesting at different periods. At each stage in the history of Darwinism a different one of Darwin's theories was referred to as Darwinism: anticreationism vs. Christian orthodoxy, gradualism vs. Mendelian saltationism, selectionism vs. Lamarckism or finalism, and so on. This continuing change of meaning poses the awkward question of what establishes the continuity among all these Darwinisms? Do these various Darwinisms have anything in common? The answer of course is that they are all based on Darwin's original paradigm, as presented in the Origin. 92
• As várias faces do Darwinismo
• as Darwin's theory of evolution: Enquadra todas as teorias? Incluindo a pângenese, uso e desuso, blending inheritance e frequencia de especiação simpátrica? Mayr discorda fortemente. 92-3
• as Evolutionism: já existia enquanto conceito biológico e forma de pensar antes de Darwin. 93
• as anticreationism: negação do fixismo e da criação especial. Dois grupos, deístas (mais focados na evolução transformacional teleológica, deus como um legislador distante) e agnósticos (mais focados no aspecto variacional, randômico alheia a leis rígidas e indepentendes de agentes sobrenaturais). No início, Darwinismo era sinonimo de rejeição a criação especial. As diferenças internas não questionavam se eles eram ou não darwinistas. "When someone in the 1860s or 1870s attacked Darwinism, he did so primarily in defense of creationism or natural yheology against these four Darwinian concepts ... There is no good evidence for [Darwin's 'One Long Argument' as an arugment in favor of natural selection]" 94-5. Para Mayr e Gillespie, a oposição a criação especial é o ponto mais abordado por Darwin. NS não aparece tanto, aparecem mais provas de comunidade de descendência. Isso explica porque a NS foi tão rejeitada, mesmo que a ideia geral de Darwin não o fosse. De fato ela não era particularmente sofisticada enquanto eemcanismo explicativo. 93-6
• as anti-ideology: outras teorias opostas ao darwinismo: essencialismo (tipologia), fisicalismo (reducionismo) e finalismo (teleologia). Evolução reinterpretada como um processo histórico contingencial. 96-7
• as selectionism: Foco na seleção natural. Interpretação moderna, derivada da síntese moderna. 97
• as variational evolution: Para os essencialistas havia um limite de variação em uma geração. No pensamento populacional isso é infinito.97-8
• as the creed of darwinians: visão de fenômeno social. darwinismo é o que os darwinistas dizem que é. Não houve nenhum dos darwinistas que concordasse 100% com darwin, assim Para Mayr é tão dificil definir um darwinista quanto o darwinismo. Para Mayr todos compartilhavam a rejeição a criação especial e a preocupação sobre e evolução por meios naturais. Os mecanismos divergiam, "only the beliefs they shared with Darwin were considered by them the truly crucial aspects of Darwinism" 100. Asa Gray, Lyell e Owen eram casos a parte. [não achei esse argumento muito convincente] 98-101
• as a new worldview: distinção entre ideologia e correntes científicas, não deveria ser aplicado ismo. "however, there are scientific theories taht have become importat pillars of ideologies ... thus, as far as seveveral of Darwin's most basic scientific theories are concerned, they have a legitimate standinf both in sciience and in philosophy" 102. Embora alie-se Darwin e Spencer (enquanto worldview) suas ideias eram bem distintas. Definição pouco informativa 101-4
• as a new methodology: Mayr defende uma pluralidade metodológica em Darwin que permite diversas discussões filosóficas. Garante também seus aspectos originais tendo em vista o que precisava ser provado. Contudo o método não era tudo, tanto que a teoria foi aceita sem se aceitar o mecanismo. 104-6
• What is darwinism?
• Whe someon asks this questionm, he is vound to receive a different answer depnding on the time tha has passed since 1859 and on th eideology of the person tha was asked. Such pluralism is no congenial to many phi,losphr, and they have been trying to find some method by which they could attac the term Darwinism to a very definite meaning. [...] [There are] only two truly meaningful concepts of darwinism, the one ruling in the neteenth century (and ip to about 1930), the othe rruling in th etwneiteth century (a consensus having been reached during the evolutionary synthesis). Any other use of the term darwinism by a modern author is bound to be misleading. 106-7

Moore 1991 - Deconstructing Darwinism: the politics of evolution in the 1860s

• O círculo mais próximo de Darwin já denunciava perversões do "darwinismo darwiniano". 355-6
• Já havia associação de darwinismo com SN, contradizendo Mayr. Religiosos faziam isso uma distinção entre darwinismo e evolucão 356, contudo "what allied them with contemporary anti-Darwinian theologians and philosophers was an aversion to natural selection as a nonteleological doctrine" 357
• Alguns já separavam darwin do darwinismo 358
• Assim
• The circle has closed. From "pure Darwinism" as what Darwin originally taught (Wallace, Gray), through "Darwinism" as what Darwin actually taught (Romanes, Hodge), or what his grandfather taught and he himself should have (Butler), to "True Darwinism" as what Darwin would have taught given the chance (Henslow), and finally, to "pure Darwinism" as what Darwin emphatically did not teach (Driesch) - the hermeneutic options are messy enough to make a tidy-minded scholar want to take sides. After all, who got it right? Who correctly interpreted what Darwin said? Who understood what Darwin really meant? Who has fair claim to represent authentic Darwinism'? 358
• Assemlha-se a Bannister: "trace what 'Darwinism' has actually been taken to mean - that is, how he word has been used" 358
• The history of Darwinism has been written pretty consistently as the history of a concept rather than a of a term. the analyss to which it has been subjected depen more on distinction made by phikosophers and biologists tyhan on those of semanticist or sociologists. "Social" Darwinism is separarted from "biological" Darwinism and biological Darwinism from "philocial" ... Darwinism as a scientific theory is broken down into component doctrines of descent with modification, naturali selection, and human evolution ... Darwinism as a worldview is held to entail alternatively naturalism, positivis, or materalism; on occasion it is foundd to be compatible with christianity. In short, Darwinism has been so many things to so many péople that David Hull lamented, 'only incidentally, it seems, was it a scientific theory about the evolution of species bu chance variation and natural selection' 360
• Hull: darwinism as historical entitity no sentido evolucionário, dissociado de essencialismo. Dá pra acreditar em pontos do darwinismo sem ser darwinista e ser darwinistas sem acreditar em todos os pontos do darwinismo. Contudo essa explicação não bate bem pois o mundo das ideias é caracterizado por hibridação 361
• historical semantics ou social history of semantics (baseada em Raymond Williams e Fleck) 362-3
• In this process the simple word that originally stood for a theory, or set of findings, becomes a slogan, and its "socio-cogitative value" is completely altered. It no longer influences the mind through its logical meaning - indeed, it often acts against this - but rather it acquires a "magical power" and exerts a "mental influence" simply by being used. 363
• Aqui concorda com Mayr "To them [his friends]   "Darinism" stood for undifferentiated evolutionary naturalism in the anticreationis mode, a ne gospoel for the life science and asnthorpology in which anural selection may or may not have been the sole or weven the most important caus of organic developkmeent." 365
• Outline
• It begins with a minority evolutionary tendency propelled by a Darwinian faction. It ends with an ascendant evolutionary party in which the Darwinian ideological tendency has been sequestered and defined. In the 1860s Darwinism's "socio-cogitative value" (to use Fleck's term) became complex and problematic; its sponsors therefore sought to differentiate its proper usage from that of critics, defectors, and wouldbe allies within the "thought-collective" of evolutionary naturalists, and among the intellectual public at large. At a crucial juncture, "'Darwinism" became natural selection, which became "pure" science. 366
• Questão dos "teólogos" gray e kingsley. 368-9
• Origin como arma ideológica nas mãos de Hooker 369
• Darwinismo para Darwin no inicio dos 1860s
• "I have sometimes almost wished Lyell had pronounced against me," he wrote Gray. "When I say 'me,' I mean only change of species by descent. That seems to me the turning-point. Personally, of course, I care much about Natural Selection; but that seems to me utterly unimportant, compared to the question of Creation or Modification."37 What Darwin would have meant by "Darwinism," if at this stage he had used the word, was thoroughgoing evolutionary naturalism. Hypothetical assent to species mutability was not enough; he demanded full-blooded belief in the uniformity of nature, from microorganisms up to man. This was the bottom line. 371
•  Darwin não gostou dos primeiros artigos de Huxley onde ele cunha o darwinismo 372 Sua definição de darwinismo era pautada por ser antiteleologica, embora contesse suas "heresias" 372-3
• Huxley divergia por acreditar nos tipos persistente de Lyell, na dispensabilidade e "implausibilidade" da NS, e na supervalorização da variação. 372
• Narra o auge e queda do X club e seus esforços editoriais para ressaltar a ciencia, incluindo o darwinismo. 373-8 Concordancia em torno do darwinismo como naturalismo não teleológico. 379
• A 1868 Darwinism era sinonimo de materialismo 380-1
• Discipulos do darwinismo aplicando suas ideias 382
• Darwinismus alemão. 383
• Darwin não chancela a tradução do generelle morphologie, mas huxley sim 383. "the elements of Haeckel's education converged. Comparative anatomy, embryology, cytology, and natural selection; liberalism, anticlericalism, and nationalism - all were transformed into a monistic evolutionary cosmology, the world into a manifestation of God" 385
• Haeckel não usou o termo de maneira errada mas o cercou de argumentos impalatáveis para os ingleses. Huxley reclamou que isso deveria ser removido na tradução (darwin concordou ) que acabou nunca acontecendo. 385-6
• Em torno de 1870 Huxley busca persuadir em vez de ofender. Envolveu-se com cursos populares. Foi neste contexto que precisou declarar-se um agnóstico 388-9, 406-8
• Discordâncias com vários personagens 389-395
• A partir de 1869 teve de ser reformulado como uma 
• theory of organic evolution caused distinctively by atural selection, ascientific tyheory wihj no metaphysical or ideologica entailments ... 'Darwinism' had taken on somethinf like the pure scientific status that Darwin had sponsored twenty year erlier. As such it qagain became a political football, tyhis time among biologists and othe rprofessionals who sought to lend it ideological contenty by prefexing "social" to the word. This is the basic sense of 'Darwinism' that has como ddown to us today. 366
• Sumário até aqui
• By mid-1869 the original phalanx of Darwinians had dwindled to approximately three. Wallace had defected over man; Lyell, Gray, and Kingsley never paid their dues; Haeckel had been banned for the time being. "Darwinism" meanwhile had become a slogan, and now returned to its first sponsors with connotations and associations they repudiated. Far from meaning evolution in general, as Huxley first intended it, or evolutionary naturalism in a nonteleological mode, as he described its "philosophical position" in 1864, Darwinism was making enemies or friends on the basis of metaphysical interpretations that actually hindered further acceptance of the general doctrines for which the word had stood before. In 1868 Hooker had made a one-off bid for semantic control by using "Darwinism" to refer directly to the theory of natural selection. A few months later Huxley called himself an agnostic in an effort to spare himself and Darwinism from ontological controversy. Neither of these ploys quite worked. There were always an awkward few who claimed to see the reality of things - that the Darwinians themselves were metaphysicians manques. One such was St. George Mivart. It was he who finally provoked Darwin himself to assert control of Darwinism. 395 
• Mivart MO
• set "Darwinism" equal to the theory of natural selection by subtracting from it the abuses and misapprehensions of critics inspired by the odium antitheologicum; then add up objections to "'Natural Selection,' pure and simple," as a sufficient cause of evolution by exploiting the divisions among the "Darwinians" and their critics; and finally, multiply instances in which the Darwinians - notably Darwin himself - by applying natural selection to morals and theological questions, evinced a "defect of logic" and a "lack of philosophical ability." Here Mivart cried foul. "Darwinism" was being used "in the interests of heterodoxy": "It is unfair . . . to ridicule certain IreligiousJ conceptions in the name of physical science, when this objection comes in reality not from physical science at all, but solely from a strong metaphysical antitheistic bias or conviction." 397
• A contenda entre eles é menos inflamada do que eu pensava. Mivart era fã de Wallace 397-8
• Para Mivart Darwinismo era igual a seleção natural, nesse sentido quase ninguém era darwinista. 398
• Darwin respondeu com força aos ataques de Mivart, arregimentando Wright 400-1
• Mivart escolástico versus Darwin indutivista. 401-2
• Wright consagra o Darwinismo como seleção natural, como ciencia pura. 403
• Ganho do controle semantico
• Semantic control is concerned with demarcation as well as definition. By limiting the meaning of "Darwinism" in a controversial environment, by sponsoring a narrow usage, the WrightDarwin pamphlet enabled the theory of natural selection to be sequestered from wider critical debates. This had been Mivart's own strategy from the start, to define Darwinism as "'natural selection,' pure and simple," with a view toward dispensing with it as an evolutionary vera causa. Wright, in accepting Mivart's terms of argument, simply promoted a different outcome: natural selection, purged of metaphysical misapprehensions, could be laid up against the day when its scientificity would be corroborated. After all, Darwin had curtailed the theory's explanatory power in successive editions of the Origin - the sixth and last edition, which he completed shortly after reissuing Wright's review, contained a chapter-full of qualifications in answer to Mivart - and the Descent of Man was significant more for revealing the theory's limitations than its scope.'23 Natural selection had in fact always meant less on the whole to the Darwinians than evolutionary naturalism, and in 1871, with "Darwinism" safely under wraps, it became possible for them to leave natural selection to the fates and get on with business as usual. 403
•  Huxley e Hooker também atacaram Mivart seguindo Wright 403-5
• On Wright's interpretation,"Darwinism" stood for a tradition of philosophical enquiry that resolutely separated "what is" from "what ought to be." Similarly, Huxley affirmed in his review that "Darwinism" as a scientific theory remained untouched by Mivart's discussions of "theology, philosophy, and ethics." The problem with "Darwinismus" in Haeckel, "Darwinianism" in Wallace's hands, "Darwinism" in Mivart's was that natural selection became a mechanism for asserting partisan doctrines of human nature and society. Haeckel was a monistic Prussian nationalist, Wallace a spiritualized Owenite socialist, Mivart a transcendental Catholic Tory. In each of their worldviews "Darwinism" was a political slogan; and the divisive effects that a politicized "Darwinism" would have on efforts to educate the Christian nation, obtain state funding for research, and reorganize and realign scientific institutions, all on the broad basis of evolutionary naturalism, were, by the time the Descent of Man appeared, a complication that a budding scientific statesman such as Huxley, his X Club comrades, and their inspiring genius, Darwin, could do without. The chastening of "Darwinism" in 1871, the cleansing of natural selection from every taint of ideology, therefore represented an important forward step in the career of science and scientists in Victorian Britain. 405
• Darwin pode também se declarar agnóstico 405-6

Martins 2006 - “Materials for the study of variation”, de William Bateson: um ataque ao darwinismo? 259-282

• Considerações metodológicas
• Aplicar rótulos aos cientistas, além de ser bastante perigoso, não constitui uma tarefa fácil. Para evitar análises sem sentido, caso se deseje classificar X como Y, faz-se necessário afirmar o que Y significa (ou o que se assume significar), e apresentar evidência de X realmente pertence àquele grupo. ... Pensamos que o uso de categorias claras pode auxiliar na pesquisa historiográfica. 261
• Por volta dos 1870s darwinismo = evolução orgânica ou teoria da descendência, mas "não devemos ver o Darwinismo como sinônimo de evolução orgânica ou teoria da descendência comum, uma vez que estes aspectos também são comuns a outras teorias de evolução." 261
• Situação do termo:
• Peter Bowler considera que a teoria da seleção natural era o coração da teoria de Darwin e que o ‘verdadeiro Darwinismo’ estava baseado na biogeografia e no estudo da evolução adaptativa (Bowler, 1990, pp. 14, 140- 141, 150). Ernst Mayr admite que no período imediatamente posterior a 1859, “o Darwinismo se referia mais frequentemente à totalidade do pensamento de Darwin, enquanto que para o biólogo evolutivo atual ele significa estritamente seleção natural” (Mayr, 1982, p. 505). Diversos autores do final do século XIX e início do século XX também admitiam que a teoria da seleção natural era a mesma coisa que Darwinismo (Kellogg, 1907, pp. 17, 26). Os chamados ‘neo-Darwinianos’ daquele tempo concordariam com essa definição, mas outros autores que também gostariam de ser chamados de ‘Darwinianos’ (Herbert Spencer, George Romanes, etc.) não concordariam. No final do século XIX, cada evolucionista tinha uma visão diferente em relação ao significado do termo ‘Darwinismo’. 262
• Critérios: 1 Deve abaracar o trabaçho de Darwin como darwiniano; deve enquadrar outros que não darwin; não deve incluir todos os evolucionistas. 262
• Darwinismo como programa de pesquisa. Para ser darwiniano deveria concordar com a maior parte das teses de Darwin e/ou seguir sua metodologia. 264
• Segue a definição de Kichter 1985: 
• O ‘Darwinismo’ poderia encerrar as idéias ou teorias propostas após a teoria original de Darwin que tivessem a maior parte dos aspectos acima relacionados. Além disso, pensamos que o Darwinismo não pode ser caracterizado por um único aspecto da teoria de Darwin, como a seleção natural, porque o próprio Darwin ressaltou que a seleção natural era a principal, mas não a causa exclusiva da transformação das espécies 265
• Porgrama de Pesquisa de Darwin (baseado em Lennox 1992): 265-6
• HARDCORE: luta pela sobrevivência; hereditariedade; variação; adequação diferenciada; SN.
• BELT: quais traços são herdávies? como variam? qual seu fitness? etc.
• Restante do artigo daz um estudo de caso com Bateson. Na concepção de Martins, sua obra é uma tentativa de avanço do programa discutindo apenas ideias do protective belt, sem atacar o hardcore. Assim, Bateson seria um darwiniano. 280

Lennox 2019 - Darwinism

• Define a teoria em 9 pontos
• Variação individual intraespecifica
• Crescimento geométrico
• Luta pela vida como limitante de crescimento
• Algumas variações darão vantagem na luta
• Individuos com essas vantagens terão mais chances de deixar descendentes
• Prole tende a herdar as características de seus pais
• SN: seleção dos individuos com essas variações
• Ao longo do tempo causa mudança nas populações
• Eventualmente, com ajuda de eliminação dos intermediários, ocorre a eliminação das variedades intermediárias
• Problemas filosóficos
1. Probabilidade: é um teoria estatística
2. Natureza, poder e escopo da seleção:
1. a causal principle instituted and sustained by God? Or is it, in its very nature, the antithesis of such a principle, as his old geology teacher Sedgwick believed? Could it possibly create species, or is it, by its nature, a negative force, eliminating what has already been created by other means? In one of his copies of On the Origin of Species, Alfred Russell Wallace crosses out ‘natural selection’ and writes ‘survival of the fittest’ next to it. Wallace always felt that ‘selection’ inappropriately imported anthropomorphic notions of Nature choosing purposefully between variants into natural history. And, in a devastating review, Fleeming Jenkin happily accepted the principle of natural selection but challenged its power to modify an ancestral species into descendent species, and thus limited its scope to the production of varieties. A number of reviewers, even some sympathetic ones, questioned the possibility of extending the theory to account for the evolution of those characteristics that differentiate humans from their nearest relatives.
3. Seleção adaptação e teleolgoia: discussão sobre a teleogia, se era boa ou não.
4. Nominalismo e essencialismo: "How are we to formulate objective principles of classification? What sort of a science of animals and plants will be possible if there are no fixed laws relating their natures to their characteristics and behaviors? ...  Organisms within a genus have common ancestors, perhaps relatively recent common ancestors; some naturalists may see ten species with a few varieties in each; others may rank some of the varieties as species and divide the same genus into twenty species. Both classifications may be done with the utmost objectivity and care by skilled observers. As systematists like to say, some of us are ‘lumpers’, some of us are ‘splitters’. Reality is neither."
5. Tempo and mode of evolution: rápido ou devagar? gradual ou saltacional? Há outros modos de evolução?
• Em seguida discute esses cinco problemas, mas não é tão interessante pra mim agora.

Sloan 2019 - Darwin: from the origin of species to descent of man

• Strains quanto a origem intelectual de darwin: ciência vitoriana, teologia natural, uniformitarismo, vera causa complementada por análises sócio construtivista. Outra strain coloca bastante peso no abolicionismo. Outra strain questiona a originalidade de Darwin e o liga ao romantismo alemão.
• Historiografia focada na sintese obscurece o entendimento da formação intelectual do prórpio darwin.
• Faz uma longa discussão sobre o debate essencialismo/nominalismo em Darwin.
• SN ao longo das eds:
• From this point onward he explicitly downplayed the intentional and teleological language of the first two editions, denying that his appeals to the selective role of “nature” were anything more than a literary figure, and he moved decisively in the direction of defining natural selection as the description of the action of natural laws working upon organisms rather than as an efficient or final cause of life. He also regrets in his Correspondence his mistake in not utilizing the designation “natural preservation” rather than “natural selection” to characterize his principle (letter to Lyell 28 September 1860, Burkhardt et al. 1993 8: 397; also see Darwin Correspondence Project in Other Internet Resources). The adoption in the fifth edition of 1869 of contemporary Herbert Spencer’s designator, “survival of the fittest” (Spencer 1864: 444–445; Origin 1869: 72), as a synonym for “natural selection”, further emphasized this shift of meaning away from the concept that can be extracted from the early texts and drafts. Thus the formulations of the principle in the final statements of the late 1860s and early 70s underlie the tradition of later “mechanistic” and non-teleological understandings of natural selection, a reading developed by his disciples who, in the words of David Depew, “had little use for either his natural theodicy or his image of a benignly scrutinizing selection” (Depew 2008: 253).
• Recepção
• This provided a context in which some could read Darwin as supplying additional support for the belief in an optimistic historical development of life under teleological guidance with the promise of ultimate historical redemption. Such readings also rendered the Origin seemingly compatible with the progressive evolutionism of Herbert Spencer (1820–1903; see the entry on Herbert Spencer). Spencer’s writings have been shown to be an important vehicle by which Darwin’s views, modified to fit the progressivist views expounded by Spencer, were first introduced in non-Western contexts (Jin 2019a,b; Yang 2013; Lightman [ed.] 2015; Pusey 1983; Elshakry 2013) Most of this popular reception ignored or revised Darwin’s concept of evolution by natural selection to fit these progressivist alternatives (Bowler 1983).
• Ver referemcas dos estudos de recepção
• França: Discussão sobre transformismo já presente no debate St. Hilaire/Cuvier. O antitransformismo de Cuvier havia ganhado. Para Claude Bernard Darwin era especulativo e não positivo.
• he intellectual framework provided by the “positive philosophy” of Auguste Comte (1798–1857) also worked both for and against Darwin. On one hand, Comte’s emphasis on the historical progress of science over superstition and metaphysics allowed Darwin to be summoned in support of a theory of the progress of science. The Origin was so interpreted in the preface to the first French translation of the Origin made by Clémence Royer (Harvey 2008). On the other hand, the Comtean three stages view of history, with its claim about the historical transcendence of speculative and metaphysical periods of science by a final period of experimental science governed by determinate laws, placed Darwinism in a metaphysical phase of speculative nature philosophy, as captured in the above quotation from Claude Bernard.
• Alemanha: Kant, romantismo alemão e idealigismo. Haeckel e o monismo materialista contra as religiões.
• China: Entrada via uma tradução de um texto de Huxley muito influenciado por Spencer. Em 1902 os primeiros caps da origem foram traduzidos por Ma Junwu que havia estudado na alemanha e no japão. Modificou o texto para concordar com spencer e a trad de huxley. Apenas em 1920 saiu uma tradução completa. Ma Junwu estava envolvido com política.
• Fala sobre as mudanças na quarta edição sobre a questão do gradualismo contínuo. [colocar isso no capítulo]
• Discute fleeming jenkin e sua relação com a pangense e mods na quinta ed.
• The pangenesis theory, although not specifically referred to, seems to be behind an important distinction he inserted into the fifth edition of the Origin of 1869 where he made a direct reply to the criticisms of Jenkin. In this textual revision, Darwin distinguished “certain variations, which no one would rank as mere individual differences”, from ordinary variations (Origin 1869: 105) [Peckham 1959 [2006: 178–179]]). This revision shifted Darwin’s emphasis away from his early reliance on normal slight individual variation, and gave new status to what he termed by the sixth edition of 1872 “strongly marked” variations. The latter were now the form of variation to be given primary evolutionary significance, and presumably this was more likely to be transmitted to the offspring, although details are left unclear. In this form it presumably could be maintained in a population against the tendency to swamping by intercrossing.
• Descent: fala do efeito das epigrafes [capitulo]. 1867 tira material do variation para fazer um ensaio sobre a humanidade. Desenvolvendo uma teoria da ética. Desse material desenvolvido em conjunto com as pesquisados Expression veio o Descent.
• Publicação quase conjunta de expression e descent. Tratamentos sobre o homem até então:
• Although the question of human evolution had already been dealt with in part by Thomas Huxley in the Man’s Place in Nature of 1863, by Charles Lyell in the same year in his Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, by Alfred Russel Wallace in articles in 1864 and 1870 (Wallace 1864, 1870 and online), and by Haeckel in his Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte of 1868, these authors had either not dealt with the full range of questions presented by the inclusion of human beings in the evolutionary process (Huxley), or they had emphasized the moral and mental discontinuity between humans and animals (Lyell, Wallace). Only Haeckel had drawn out a more general reductive conception of humanity from evolutionary theory and he had not ventured into the specific issues of ethics, social organization, the origins of human races, and the relation of human mental properties to those of animals, all of which are dealt with in the Descent.
• Trouxe mais apoio dos materialistas e menos dos religiosos.
• The more fundamental opposition was due to the denial of distinctions, other than those of degree, between fundamental human properties and those of animals. Furthermore, the apparent denial of some kind of divine guidance in the processes behind human evolution and the non-teleological character of Darwin’s final formulations of the natural selection theory in the fifth and sixth editions of the Origin, hardened this opposition. His adoption from Herbert Spencer of designator “survival of the fittest” as a synonym for “natural selection” in the fifth edition added to this growing opposition. As a consequence, the favorable readings that many influential religious thinkers—John Henry Newman (1801–1890) is a good example—had given to the original Origin, disappeared. The rhetoric of the Descent, with its conclusion that “man is descended from a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears” (1871: vol. 2: 389), presented to the public a different Darwin than many had associated with the author of the Journal of Researches and the early editions of the Origin.
• Seleção sexual explicando dimorfismo e origem da humanidade.
• what has been termed “social Darwinism” may have developed independently of Darwin
• Fala da filosofia ética de darwin no descent
• Darwinismo como programa lakotosiano ajuda a entender sua recepção.