POPULARIZATION - Whitley 1985; Jacobi, 1986; Meadows 1986; Hilgartner 1990; Cooter & Pumfrey 1994; Wynne 1995; Drouin & Bensaude-Vincent 1996; Bucchi 1998; Zamboni 1998; Grundmann & Cavaillé (2000); Myers 2003; Secord 2004; Vergara 2008; Bensaude-Vincent 2009; Daum 2009; Gavroglu 2012; Esteves 2014; Machado 2014; Morcillo 2020

Whitley 1985

• "In the common conception of scientific popularisation the audience is typically viewed as large, diffuse, undifferentiated and passive". Não produtores de conhecimento 4
• Transformação de foram sem alterar conteúdo. 7
• Dialética supostamente impossível, mas isso não se sustenta. Não só com relação a necessidade de cooperação, mas " in many scientific fields non-specialists are directly involved in the determination of research strategies, of topics to be pursued and of approaches to be followed" 8-9
• "Because the conventional view of popularisation conceives scientific knowledge to be unitary and epistemologically privileged, it is incapable of appreciating the partial nature of popularising currently accepted knowledge as truth" 10
• Intrascientific popularisation. Collective assertion and claim to authority. 10

16

• Atributos da audiência: tamanho e heterogeneidade. 16 Também prestígio e opinião pública 18
• In summary, a low degree of technical sophistication and justification of arguments in the popularisation of scientific knowledge occurs when there is considerable cognitive distance between scientists and their audience, and scientists have a high degree of autonomy in setting and applying competence and significance standards. Mass media reporting of major discoveries are examples of this situation. Greater technical precision and formalisation of language coupled with a high degree of simplification and incontrovertibility arises when cognitive distance is lower but scientists are relatively independent of the audience, such as communication to students. Ordinary language presentations which go into considerable detail occur when dependence on the audience is higher and it is either quite cognitively distant and/or research procedures are relatively diffuse and informal. Finally, more technically sophisticated and formal forms of popularisation combined with extensive arguments and details are manifested when the degree of cognitive distance is low, the field has quite standardised and formalised research methods and it is relatively dependent upon the audience for access to resources, especially scientific prestige. 20-1
• Conclusão
• . As the empirical natural sciences grew in prestige and ability to control substantial resources, their intellectual standards came to dominate general conceptions of knowledge and truth and, at the same time, separated the production of scientific knowledge from the educated public so that research became an esoteric activity. The popularisation of scientific knowledge then became a means of claiming legitimacy for many social movements and interest groups, and also part of scientists' claims for social support and legitimacy as a separate group of autonomous intellectuals. By successfully combining claims to universal validity and social utility through popularisation, they laid the foundation for the present domination and expansion of the sciences. 25
• Popularização Intra e extracc 25-6

Ver Green para um estudo da ideologia cientista em portar a cc como boa e a midia como má. 158

Cloître & Shinn 1985

• Mertonina vs relativist 31
• Continumm (intraspecialist, interspecialist, pedagogical and popular) and exposition as active in knowledge production. 32
• Caracterização
• s depicted in our typology (see Table I), the abundance of phenomenological and protocol references and the dearth of historical and industrial considerations clearly distinguish specialist writings from other scientific genres, and particularly, from the popular press whose referential characteristics are symmetrically inversed. For their part, inter-specialist texts share much in common with specialist papers, with the proviso that the latter concentrate much more on protocol than they do on neighbouring fields, the former focusing more on broad research 'issues. In the case of "being popular" authors rely heavily on historical referents, while in addition, integrating industrial themes. The historical referent also figures importantly in pedagogical texts where it is combined with moderate use of references to phenomena, protocol and research in neighbouring fields. So, in some respects, the referentiallogic of pedagogical texts is twofold, divided between the specialist end of the spectrum on the one hand, and the popular, on the other. 33
• contrary to conventional wisdom, metaphors only occur alone in popular articles. In the same manner, iconic representation is restricted to this genre. Specialist texts, for their part, are characterized by a profusion of graphs. Intense reification appears in those instances where researchers seek to transgress disciplinary boundaries, as is witnessed in the images frequently used in pedagogy and inter-specialist writings. Finally, schemas are employed for pedagogical purposes to demonstrate the operation of experimental material and lastly, to depict basic structures of phenomena to a lay public. 35
• Argument-based differentiation of expository texts evinces some of the same characteristics associated with the referential parameter. Quantitative argument and the property of restrictiveness sharply differentiate specialist and popular texts. But contrary to what could be concluded by a hasty examination of the types of arguments contained in specialist and popular literature, restrictiveness and quantitative thought are not necessarily linked to one another. In the case of inter-specialist texts, acute restrictiveness is paired with quantitative arguments which, in turn, are accompanied by qualitative thought. Finally, pedagogical texts contain moderate amounts of the three forms of argument 35-6
• No intraespecialista há uma "dynamic-state conduct" entre analysis of phenomena, social constraints e conceptiual possibilities. Interpretação mertoniana e relativista não são mutuamente excludentes aqui. 39
• Entreespecialista apresenta pesquisas em campos vizinhos e depende de reificação. Visão pessoal. 40
• Pedagogical. Referencias históricas e reificação. 43
• Popular: "In popular exposition, the process of treatment moves from the phenomena outwards towards other sets of concerns, while in the cases of intra- and inter-specialist documents and pedagogy, the movement is funneled towards the phenomena.". Conhecimento de outros campos 47
•  Metaforas 48.
• While analogy operates through deconstruction and comparison (a is like b) where similarities and limitations are always stipulated, in metaphor significance is generated through a process of fusion and even con-fusion (a is b). ... We designate the knowledge derived from such metaphors as "degenerated knowledge", that is to say, knowledge which is so constituted that the nature and relationships of its component elements totally preclude an unequivocal, or even, a coherent "multivocal" grasp of the phenomena. Degenerated knowledge is so distended and distorted, with respect to the initial phenomenological referent, that no mental operations based on the metaphors alone enable a reader to retrieve the phenomenon in question. Degeneracy appears particularly strong in the articles of practising scientists where metaphors evince the qualities of a "word-game", producing nonsense. In such cases, it represents a strategy for justifying the importance of science in contemporary culture and for acquiring broad-based social approval, and not a cognitive device. 48
• Scientific notice board 51 [knowing over knowledge]
• Cristalização > Instead circulating freely, from one expo sitory genre to another, cognitive mobility is impeded or blocked. 52
• Desvio > cognition is intentionally shifted from one expository genre to another with the idea in mind that the expository standards and criteria of the alternative category are more felicitous for the growth of the idea at hand. 55
• Conclusão: the characteristics associated with each type of exposition are not simply artificial devices for delimiting expository categories, but they also constitute active agents which interact with one another, so affecting the research process. 57
• Conclusão geral
• In this paper, we have suggested that scientific exposition occurs along a continuum where categories of texts are not completely separated from one another. The traditional argument that scientific popularization is somehow radically different from other classes of science associated texts, thus tends to collapse. Our study indicates, for example, that, without exception, every type of writing reflects its authors' social drives, be they enhanced professional recognition or a search for allies in support of a pet idea. Yet, the presence of this admittedly important social register in every expository genre should not be interpreted as signifying that all sorts of texts arc essentially the same. On the contrary, analysis of content-structure, namely argument, imagery and referent, reveals that in some critical respects, they are also very dissimilar. For their part, specialist texts largely revolve around tightly reasoned discussions of experimental limit conditions, instrument precision and the relevance of results. Scientific popularization on the other hand, operates as a conduit for informing scientists and non-scientists of recent discoveries and advances, and as a platform for viewing scientific events against a backdrop of non-scientific interests and concerns. Finally, as regards the research process itself, popularizing offers a cognitive space where, as yet fragile and unstructured projects, can be reflected on, free from the epistemological constraints that characterize other expository modes to differing degrees, and free from an acute risk of professional embarrassment. Yet, beyond their respective particularities, these two expository modes also converge in areas of utmost importance, as both examine subject matter and couch their messages in terms of quantitative dimensions and schematic imagery. 58
•  The attempts of scientists to recast knowledge in order to transfer it from one expository category to another tend to shed light on the inadequacies and potential of the ideas and results at hand, and to provide information useful for further analysis. Seen from this perspective, exposition is a dynamic agent in the research process. For instance, in "crystallization", the adherence of researchers to the parameters of a single expository genre curtails possible cognitive trajectories leading to other genre and thereby impedes knowledge development through restricting the representation or techniques to which the phenomenon is subjected. Somewhat conversely, in deviation, a broad range of avenues is open between different categories of exposition, which allow researchers to communicate on a multitude of levels. In sum, deviation constitutes an active system of cognitive networking which serves as a lubricant in the research process. 59

Jacobi 1985 (1986 tbm)

• Discourso cientifico como ideal (autoridade) e vulgarizado como reformulação degradada (traduzido) [tradução como coisa ruim]. Para Jacobi a popularização é plural e difícil de ser cateogrizada §4-6
• La vulgarisation est traduction swe la langue savante em langue vulgaire (ou commune plus precisement). Dans ce cas le vulgarisateur se trouce très exactement entre le spécialiste et le non spécialiste, virtuose des deux registres, il interprète le discours de la science en usant dus eul registre commun à la pluralité des destinataires: la langue moyenne. l 'ágit d'une traduction intralinguale voisine de l'autre, plusconnue, où l'interprète doit daire passer le discours d'une langue ible dans une autre. §8
• Sapir e a facilidade de tradução das "verdades científicas"> L'art du journaliste vulgarisateur consisterait d'une part à retrouver la nudité de la verité scientifique et à la traduitre dans une langue, plus simple, à la portée de tout un chacun. §12-3 Mas isso só funciona com taxonomias descritivas §14
• Primeira onda de trabalhos sobre vs colocam o vulgarizador como tradutor de discurso e são demarcacionistas de discurso §17-21
• Crítica
• Ces analyses [recéntes] suggèrent que le discours de v.s. ne remplace pas le discours source ésotérique, ni ne le traduit réellement. Il l'érige en spectacle, le montre, l'exhibe sans jamais l'effacer. Il le dénature, le court-circuite sans pourtant le dévaloriser, ou le remplacer effectivement. §23-24
• Três tendências em VS: figuras de linguagem; metalinguagem; substituições terminológicas §27-30
• Vai contra a tipologização dos discursos, diz que é muito turvo. §49-52
• Não há dois discursos opostos, mas um continuum §53
• le discours de v.s. peut se replacer dans l'ensemble des discours scientifiques (dont il dépend et dérive quand il n'en est pas une variante), discours qui sont caractérisés par une exacerbation de la dimension dialogique §68 (ver também 67)
• Sobre ilustrações (ilustração como tradução nessa seção)

• Peut-on pour autant estimer que l'existence d'un double système de signes puisse constituer une clef d'interprétation et de code particulier?/ On formulerait alors une hypothèse du type « mise en images » postulant l'existence d'une sorte de correspondance ou de redondance entre les deux systèmes. §71-2

• VS no interior do campo científico §90-102

Meadows 1986

• Early readers were easily fooled. 341
• "Popularization  becomes  necessary when an area of knowledge moves into the hands of a  limited number  of specialists, and its  contents  then become  impenetrable to  others." 341
• Mathmatization of science excluded readers 341
• Especialização e profissionalização aumentaram a exclusão de outras disiciplinas com o passar do tempo 342
• Science fiction começa no XIX mas segue atualmente como as principais fontes "científicas da maioria das pessoas. 343
• "The first specialist science correspondents appeared in the 1920s and 1930s" antes disso eram os proprios cientistas 344
• Lectures no xix 344 Na II guerra e na Guerra fria vem a cc como notícia. Talvez até demais 345-7

Hilgartner 1990

• "the popularization of science is rooted in the idealized notion of pure, genuine scientific knowledge against which popularized knowledge is contrasted"; Two stage model; "popularization is, at best, 'appropriate simplification' ... at worst, popularization is 'pollution', the 'distotion' of sicence". 519
• Essa visão serve retoricamente aos cientistas. 520
• "Popularized knowledge feeds back into the research process ... Scientists learn about fields outside their immediate research areas from popular accounts, and these shape their beliefs about both the content and the conduct of science" 522 Necessidade de simplificação 522 inclusive com finalidades políticas 531
• Genuine e Popularized knowledge são categorias ambíguas difíceis de serem demarcadas. 524

528

• "the point is simply that 'popularization is a matter of degree'" 528 flexibility 529
• "Comparing a later, 'downstream' representation with an earlier, 'upstream' version will always reveal some differences. The question then, in any particular case, is whether the changes are significant. Is the particular transformation 'misleading' (and therefore blameworthy)? Or would it be nitpicking to argue that the difference mattered? Do the changes make the downstream statement 'distorted', 'incorrect', or 'oversimplified'? Or do they leave it 'appropriate', 'accurate', and 'essentially correct'?" 529 Não são questões objetivas, mas julgamentos. 529
• Usos políticos dos cientistas 530-2
• Cientistas controlam o limite da popularização e da distorção 534

[1 - Whitley in Shinn e Whitley (1985), critica o modelo vigente; 2 - Green in Shinn e Whitley (1985) fala da ideologia cientista em relação a popularização; Star (Simplification in Scientifix Work, 1983), fala da necessidade de simplificação;  [Na verdade ele cita o Shinn e Whitley inteiro]]

Cooter & Pumfrey 1994

• Pouco se sabe sobre pop na ciencia. Med foi estudada, Darwin e Newton foram estudados, mas pouco além. 237-8
• "There are obvious differences between the study of 'popular' science in all its conceivable operations over time, and the study of the myriad processes of 'popularization' ... It is difficult therefore to treat 'popularization' of science as a uniform or universal process." 239
• Separação de cc e pop
• Until recently, one might have accounted for the relative neglect of historical studies of popularscience and popularization in terms ofthe cultural hegemony of science itself: historians of science merely colluded with scientists in their belief that the productions of scientific knowledge were insulated from nonscientists and from the public at large. .... Science as product was boxed away from society, its production epistemologically privileged, its audience conceived as entirely yielding to new forms of natural knowledge. 239-40
• As with religion, historians need not regard science in popular culture simply as a form of false consciousness." To see cultural forms as neither 'corrupt' nor 'authentic' in themselves better equips us to recuperate historical processes, rather than valorize or belittle them. Indeed, even where it is clear that popularizers of science sought to inculcate middle-class values and scientific optimism, it does not necessarily follow that science in popular culture functioned to that end. Perhaps, then, by becoming more discursive about meanings and ambivalences," and less ideologically prescriptive, the history of science in popular culture can begin significantly to contribute to a more historical sociology and anthropology ofknow1- edge. 247
• In short, 'popular science' may diverge from 'learned science' not because the latter is poorly understood, but because it is developed by its recipients for different purposes. The latter might include subtle, implicit forms ofresistance to dominant authority and belief, at the same time as it might entail acculturation 249-50
• Segue o modelo racionalista no qual o conhecimento popularizaod é um simulacro imperfeito do conhecimento científico. 240 Já pós 1970s com a sociologia da ciência "the best that could be said for the popularization ofscience was that it served to maintain the authority ofscience by legitimating the fiction ofits autonomy and the asocial production ofits 'truths'." 241
• Pouca atenção foi dada ao público em si. 244
• Problema de pertencimento no estudos culturais 245-6
• Thus the subject of popular science has emerged, in effect, as an intellectually 'inauthentic' sphere - a place where professional status for homo academicus'e has been difficult to accrue because ofthe subject's location outside a celebratory intellectual populism. Only in terms of the history of antiscience or resistance to science and scientistic authority has it seemed possible to capitalize, that is, by allying science to the tradition of oppositional popular culture and social politics. 246
• Modelo difusionista elitista de ciência trickle down. 248
• Alistamento do público pelos cc e dos cc pelo público 250 Ligações com marxismo 251
• Modelo elite versus popular é problemático também ao assumir homogenização. 251
• Dois pontos a ter em mente: ser responsivo a pluralidade de lugares de facção e reprodução da cc e a pluralidade de significados da atividade cc. 

[ver 3 omission of pop; 25 reception of sci beliefs; 34; 36-7 secord; 39-40; 43; 63; 67; 92; 99]

Wynne 1995

• Public elites keep control as revealed by cc 361
• Constructivist perspective > Dialética entre cc e soc Golinski 1992 e Shapin e Schaffer 1985
• In many dominant formulations (e.g., Royal Society, 1985), PUS is automatically equated with public appreciation and support of science, and with the public's "correct" understanding and use of "technical" knowledge and advice. Thus, when publics resist or ignore a program advanced in the name of science, the cause is assumed to be their misunderstanding of the science. The PUS research agenda is thus confined to measuring, explaining, and finding remedies for apparent shortfalls of "correct understanding and use" as if this were free of framing commitments that have social implications. 362
• . The separation of the cognitive and social dimensions that inform dominant approaches to PUS must accordingly be seen as an artifact. 363
• In this chapter I adopt the view, informed by SSK, that a proper approach to PUS has to problematize what is meant not only by "science" but also by understanding"; in other words, scientific meaning cannot be taken for granted as if deterministically provided by nature or some other privileged authority. This also automatically problematizes the "public" in well beyond the obvious sense that there are countless "publics" of science. Recent research on public responses to scientific expertise suggests that "understanding" is a function, inter alia, of social identification with scientific institutions, and these processes of identification or alienation are multiplex, often fractured, and chronically open to redefinition (Michael, 1992; Wynne, 1992a) 364
•   Passa muitas paginas detalhando pesquisas que fazem suposições e analises simplistas ou simplificantes da cc e do público. 365-70
• Agora mental models e etnografia para entender o understanding 370-5
• Knowledge in social context - resitência, confiança, relevância etc 375-383
• PUS e SSK
• In other words, ANT overlooks and conceals the ambivalence that an actor may tacitly hold toward a network with which she apparently completely identifies.
• While this is a valuable argument, it also falls short in one important respect. Collins assumes that without a technical deconstruction the public is doomed to a false certainty about the result. Yet PUS research shows that people usually have several dimensions by which they can relate to and judge such claims, for example, by the institutional demeanor, interests, and historical experience of the authors (Wynne, 1982). It is misleading to assume that, without such technical deconstruction, people are bound to be dupes of the tacit way the science was constructed. A richer understanding of how authority is negotiated for science is offered by closer convergence of mainstream SSK and constructivist PUS research.  383-4
• US research has found ample evidence of the reflexivity of laypeople in problematizing and informally negotiating their own relationship to "science." It has also identified the silent alienation created by the unreflexive ways in which scientists construct the public in their interactions with them. The unreflexive responses of the scientific establishment appear to reflect a deep institutional insecurity about actually encountering lay publics on their terms and negotiating valid knowledge with them. 385
• Very little of the voluminous work down the years on participation in science and technology has addressed these dimensions, remaining instead at the cruder conceptual level of competing interests and rights, where scientific knowledge remains substantially unproblematized except in notions of deliberate political manipulation
• HC
• History of science, by contrast, has long provided a rich seam of research insights and historical studies supporting the general SSK orientation. Hilgartner's (1990) study of postwar popularization in the United States identifies the tacit anxieties of scientific elites about social order and public affirmation. Similar observations have been made about the reemergence of a strong concern about public understanding of science in the 1980s (Wynne, 1992e). Layton (1973) and Barnes and Shapin (1979) noted similar implicit agendas, respectively, in movements of "science for the people" in the nineteenth century and the eighteenth-century English Mechanics' Institutes. Haraway's (1989, 1992) historical studies of primatology, and other "externalist" histories of science (e.g., Barnes & Shapin, 1979; Berman, 1974; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; R. Young, 1986), expose recurrent concerns to have the public assimilate a proper understanding of science as part of the establishment of ideological versions of the natural (social) order. Much of this work, however, implies by default that such elite discourses are automatically effective. Desmond's (1987) study of the forms of resistance of working- class people to dominant discourses of "natural knowledge" adds important depth to this perspective because it emphasizes that public recipients of science are not mere dupes of dominant discourses. 386
•  Scientific institutions are, despite what some assume (e.g., Giddens, 1990), very weak on the self-reflexivity that would allow them to recognize their unwitting role in their own crises of public credibility and support. 387
• Ver Beck 1986 e 1992 sobre
•  a negotiated diversification of the grand univocal principles of rationality and natural order that have dominated modernity, into more modest forms that reflexively recognize their own conditional foundations and intrinsic limits. 387
• The problem for the conventional forms of defense of a legitimate role for science in an increasingly decentered "postmodern" context is that they are inherently self-defeating. Control over public definitions of what is to count as science is still anxiously clung to (as reflected in the dominant PUS problem definition) as if there is only one natural version; yet scientists routinely negotiate definitions of "good science" among themselves, including that for public consumption (Jasanoff, 1990). The innumerable attempts by ordinary publics in effect to negotiate what counts as legitimate public knowledge are frequently defined by those anxious elites as "antiscience." Holton's (1992) historical review is a case in point, treating any questioning of the modernist project, with its epistemological principle of instrumental control, as a fundamental threat to order and reason per se. 387

Drouin & Bensaude-Vincent 1996

• Ideia de que NH é naturalmente mais popular devido a falta de matemática. 409
• This chapter will try to present the alleged 'popularity' of natural history as the result of a number of strategies for raising interest in the subject among various social groups. Rather than simply assuming that natural historu was uniquely able to bridge the growing gap beteen expert knoeldge and the non-expert population, we will show that these tow cateories graduaally emrged through tensions and debtes amongs naturalists. 409
• Público geral surge antes da popularização. Tinha regras estritas. Cuvier considera o público um impeditivo para a boa ciência. Essa oposição influenciou a criação da popularização 410-3
• Duas características: narrativas pitorescas e preocupação com utilidade.  Mas sem recursos literários. Tentam ser mais concisos 414
• "the difference between popular and technical literature is more subtle than usually believed" Não refletem ideias apenas, podem questionar. Não se abstém de detalhes técnicos sempre. 414-5
• Profissionalização cria experts e amadores 418-9
• "In conclusion, the popular natural history tradition can be seen as a major aspect which contributed to shaping the discipline. Though natural history was never 'popular in itself', it remained open to various degrees of non-specialized languages and to various forms of practice. A clear-cut distinction between science and the public could not be strictly defined around a territory, like the space of the laboratory in sciences sucha as physics or chemistry. However, through tensions and debates between various writers and practioneers, the growth of popular natural history both created an image of the public and, at the same time, stabilized the identity of the 'natural scientist'" 424

Bucchi 1998

• Discurso de cisma desde o XVII, mas large scale a partir do XIX (daily press, magazines e fairs e exhibtions)
• This addition to a model of communication of science ‘à la carte’, i.e. one addressed to a select, motivated audience, of a model of ‘science du chef’ with its fixed menu whose delights the general public was urged to sample,4 was a crucial step in securing a conception of public communication of science as benevolent alms-giving by scientists to a large and poorly informed audience. 
• As the written communication of science to the public consolidated itself as a specific media genre (with its appropriate rules of access and formats5 ), the nature of its performers also became clear. The existence of a category of writers responsible for the ‘dissemination’ of scientific knowledge was soon acknowledged, and indeed deemed essential, given the sensational advancement and specialization of the natural sciences. 2
• Basic arguments da visão canônica de cc communication: superspecialização > mediação (por terceiro culpável) > 
•  This mediation is most often described through the metaphor of linguistic translation. As a sort of interpreter, the ‘third person’ should simply accomplish the task of reformulating scientific discourse in more simple words. From this point of view, the problem of communicating science to the public, then, is reduced to a mere matter of linguistic competence. 3
• The use of terms like ‘popularization’ or ‘dissemination’ is itself symptomatic of this idealized and largely unproblematic vision of public communication of science. 3-4
• Dominou até a segunda metade do XX.
• It is clear that such a ‘science-centred, paternalistic and pedagogic’ orientation17 entails not only an idealized vision of scientific activity, but also a normative approach to the processes of communicating science to the public. Terms like distortion, sensationalization and inaccurate translation only make sense by reference to the most outdated models of communication. As a unidirectional, linear communication transfer from one sender (the scientific community) to a completely passive receiver (the broad, uninformed public), the process should in no way affect the nature and content of original information. Therefore, efforts should be devoted to the minimizing of all those ‘noises’ which impede proper reception and understanding (and are, it goes without saying, nothing but a byproduct of journalistic mediation). 4-5
• Objetificação e ancoramento 6
• Social representation reconhece a popularização como algo mais complexo mas ainda não é dialética. 7
• Metaphors, visual images and ‘prototheories’28 are not just embellishments with which to dress up a theory when presenting it to the public (in place of esoteric calculations and formal expressions).29 Instead, they are constitutive elements of the theory itself.30 This is not to imply that a scientific theory cannot be enriched or transformed by its subsequent public presentations. However, these possible ‘enrichments’ or transformations often stem from those same representation processes employed by scientists. ‘It is the researchers themselves who propose reinterpretations susceptible of constituting representations.’31 Therefore, the problem is not just one of describing what happens to scientific theories as soon as they cross the borders of the scientific enclave. It is also that of understanding ‘how scientists, after elaborating theories, or simply concepts characteristic of their discipline, do transform them in order to make them suitable for propagation within differentiated publics’.32 7
• HC e SC também descondiravam o estudo do tema 8
• Continuum: Intraspecialist, interspecialist, pedagogical, popular - cristalização e desvio (Cloître e Shinn) 9 > Duas formas de ativação: 1) consensual linear tradicional 2) controversa bidirecional heterodoxa. Desvios não encaixam nem no tradicional nem no continuum. 13
• Deviation to the public seems related to peculiar crisis situations which cannot be managed within the scientific community. 15
• Ficção analítica
• analytical fiction which is introduced by dividing the expository continuum into stages, inappropriately identifying it with a temporal sequence 19
• communication occurs simultaneously at different levels which continuously exert reciprocal influence on each other. 19
• the intraspecialist stage may function as a filter for public attention, but the public stage, too, may function as a filter for specialists. 20
• Metáforas 22-29
• Boundary objects
• may be thought of as the pivotal discursive elements that lie at the core of boundary negotiation in public. They make communication possible without necessarily requiring consensus, for an object may be interpreted and used in quite different ways at different levels of communication and by different groups of actors within a single level ... 6 ‘Gene’ and ‘DNA’ are familiar examples of boundary objects, labels employed at different levels of scientific communication and thereby providing a common language although they are translated in different ways in a laboratory conversation and in a car advertisement.87 31
• Boundary objects are translated and manipulated at different levels of communication with different intensities and meanings by the various groups involved. 133
• A cluster of other linguistic elements like metaphors and paradoxes usually surrounds a boundary object and guarantees connection to individual levels, in a chain of translations which further anchor it to the representations and frameworks specific to each social world. Thus, cold fusion is described as a ‘marriage between neutrons’ and a germ as an ‘invader of the body’. It is not uncommon for a metaphor or a paradox to form the core of a boundary object, as in the expressions ‘Big Bang’ and ‘cold fusion’. 133

2008

• The passage of a scientific notion through these various levels therefore cannot be described as the simple translation of an object from one communicative context to another. Each step – and this is one of the central messages of Fleck’s (pp 113-115) book – involves a change in the notion. 62

Zamboni 1998

• Authier vê a divulgação como algo degradado. Vivo e colorido para Zamboni 390
• O discurso da DC é caracterizado por ela como resultande de umt rabalho de reofgmulação explícita que 'longe de esconder a maquinaria, mosdtra-a sistemtaicamente" (1982:36), em contraponto à operação de tradução propriamente dita, que "esocnde" o trabalho de refomrulaçã, a ponot de se ignora que a tradução produto resultou da interferÊncia interlingual de um determinado sujeito. .... Por essa concepção, o discurso da DC mantém vinculação ao campo científico, onde se aloja como um discurso heterogeneo, dialógico, aproximativo, "como não sendo o 'verdadeiro' discurso científico homogêneo". 392-3
• Ressalvas: DC como discurso de transmissão de ideias especializadas, não é discurso CC. O discurso dos cientistas na DC não pertence ao discurso da CC, pois já foram vulgarizados. 393
•  Discurso de especialidade > discurso de transmissão de informação. 394
• Maquinaria visível como expressão de subjetividade, não como maquinaria visível. 394

Authier 1982 

• Modelo difusionista de divulgação. Mediação 34
• VS
• la V. S. se donne donc d'emblée comme pratique de reformulation d'un discours source (désormais Dl) dans un discours second (D2). Par là, elle s'inscrit dans un ensemble qui comprend traduction, résumé, contraction de texte, et aussi textes pédagogiques adaptés à tel ou tel niveau, analyses politiques reformulées « en direction de » tel ou tel groupe social, messages publicitaires réécrits en fonction de la « cible » visée, etc. 35
•  2.1
• Une opération de traduction vise à fournir un texte D2, la traduction produit, se substituant au texte Dl comme équivalent. Son travail de reformulation peut demeurer implicite au point que l'on peut ignorer que D2 résulte d'une traduction. S'il est explicité, c'est comme en dehors du corps même de D2, ... Et c'est bien, entre autres, sur ce caractère non explicite de la reformulation que s'appuient les mythes et idéaux têtus de l'effacement du traducteur et de la transparence de D2 à l'original Dl; leurres contre lesquels les travaux portant sur la traduction7 doivent réaffirmer son caractère de « réénonciation spécifique d'un sujet historique7 », les paramètres déterminant la production de D2, les phénomènes d'interférences repérables dans D2... 35
• Au contraire du D2 produit-de-traduction qui, s'il reflète inévitablement les modalités de son énonciation, « ne montre pas les coulisses de l'exploit », le D2 produit-de-V.S. se donne explicitement comme résultant d'un travail de reformulation du D 1 ; loin de cacher la machinerie, il la montre systématiquemen ... fait de Dl non pas seulement la source mais l'objet, mentionné, de D2; dans la constitution du « fil du discours » ensuite (en 2.3.), marqué, tout au long, d'opérations locales explicites de citation, traduction, ajustement, glose. 36
• Construção de uma imagem potencialmente distorcida ou ilusória de D1 em D2. 36
• 2.2 double structure enonciative 36 2.2.3 "Un discours a été tenu qui est l'objet de notre discours" ... : D2 montre renonciation du Dl qu'il entend rapporter et se montre lui-même dans son activité de rapport. 38
• 2.2.1
• La reformulation par discours rapporté est une modalité très particulière, en ce qu'elle fait place dans le D2 à la mention de Dl et de son énonciation : faisant de Dl son objet explicite, elle se place d'emblée, vis-à-vis de lui, dans une position distanciée, dite, qui est incompatible avec l'idée d'une copie de Dl, qu'elle soit produite par traduction, contraction, adaptation... 36
• 2.2.2.2 "Dois nós" publico e ciência por mediação. 38
• 2.2.3 configuration de roles representés: science > mediateur > public lecteur. 39
• ; il se donne — entre l'originalité de l'auctor et la transparence du scriptor — un statut ambigu de commentator — compilator, s'évertuant, dans l'effacement, à mettre les deux pôles en contact 
• eux images, contradictoires et complémentaires, se dégagent de cette configuration : celle d'une idylle pédagogique à l'ombre de la Science, où, solidaires dans leur rôle dissymétrique, le vulgarisateur et le lecteur collaborent à un travail de transmission de connaissance, difficile mais méritoire et fructueux; celle d'une tâche de communication impossible à laquelle se voue le vulgarisateur écartelé, au service de deux exigences en fait incompatibles, disant ses excuses et ses réticences, missionnaire toujours au bord de l'échec ou du sacrilège. 39
• 2.3
• En effet, si la mise en contact de deux langues, avec ses va-et-vient, ses recherches d'équivalences, sa réflexion métalinguistique, ses retouches et ses remords est le travail qu'effectue le traducteur pour parvenir à remplacer un texte en langue 1 par un texte homogènement réalisé en langue 2, dans la V.S. la mise en contact de deux « langues » est le travail qui est réalisé par et dans le discours second qui montre la reformulation en train de se faire et dont le fil, hétérogène, passe d'une « langue » à l'autre 13 à travers une multitude d'opérations qui, exhibées ici, ne seraient repérables dans une traduction que par d'éventuelles traces 40
• Equivalencia de termos 40
• 2.3.4 e 2.4
• Les deux discours montrés comme étrangers l'un à l'autre, image en discours du dialogue rompu entre communauté scientifique et public, sont mis en contact dans un discours un, dans son hétérogénéité, qui s'institue luimême comme un lieu de rencontre — et non comme un simple instrument de transmission. Le rapport communauté / hétérogénéité propre au système de la langue21 est ce qui fonde ce discours unique qui réunit et sépare deux discours; mis en relief dans le discours de V.S., il y détermine l'espace dans lequel le rétablissement de la communication science-public — fonction dévolue à la V.S. — est « mis en scène » dans son ambiguïté contradictoire : réalise et pourtant impossible, associant la réussite d'une transmission-acquisition du discours de la science à l'échec de sa dégradation. 
• ...
• Le « parler pour les autres » proclamé dans les textes de V.S. ce sont ces deux formes du dialogisme, vues dans le miroir grossissant de l'explicitation systématique : le vulgarisateur parle pour — à la place de l'un, scientifique, et parle pour — à l'intention de l'autre, public; avec les mots des deux, donc, dans un discours marqué par cette double détermination. Rien d'étonnant si la V.S. bascule si aisément, à travers les siècles, dans la forme de la conversation23 : du dialogisme interne montré, à travers lequel le discours réalise une mise en scène de la médiation — communication, qui caractérise le « genre » de la V.S., au dialogue « externe » de la conversation, il n'y a qu'un pas à franchir. 43-44
• VS garante o status realista do D1 científico em sua dupla enunciação. 45
• 3
• Le souci de Г autre-récepteur, si ostensiblement manifesté dans le travail de simplification, de « traduction », instaure une relation pédagogique qui n'est pas celle du face à face maître-savoir / élève où s'inscrit si aisément selon Bourdieu et Passeron 27 «la relation archétypale avec le père28» : entre les deux, comprehensive, presque séductrice dans sa complicité, une figure se dessine, qui s'efforce d'aplanir le chemin du savoir, indulgente à l'imperfection reconnue du résultat; est ainsi mise en scène, par différence avec un didactisme sévère, une pédagogie <r maternante » qui présente par rapport à l'autre un statut ambigu : son visage aimable offre le savoir à tous, sans exclusive, mais ce n'est, elle le dit elle-même, qu'un savoir approximatif— laissant entrevoir que la forme « véritable » du savoir demeure réservée à la pédagogie institutionnelle et par voie de conséquence à ses contraintes et à ses « sélections » 46
• Crítica/conclusão
• Cette identification [ l'identification du vulgarisateur et du lecteur : celles d'un couple d'interlocuteurs de bonne volonté, surmontant, avec les moyens dont il dispose, les obstacles à la communication et au désir de savoir] est facilitée et renforcée par la mise en jeu, par le mode de fonctionnement du discours, d'une des représentations les plus ancrées de la communication : nous avons vu combien le discours de V.S. dit qu'il est approximatif, hétérogène, dialogique; mais dire l'approximatif c'est renvoyer implicitement à l'absolu... Aussi ce discours est-il aussi le lieu où se célèbre, absent, un discours absolu, homogène, monologique, dont luimême ne serait qu'une image dégradée. De ce fonctionnement, le discours scientifique tire évidemment un effet de sacralisation, mais surtout c'est la mise en scène de la communication qui bénéficie de la force des schémas mythiques qu'elle fait jouer : celui, nostalgique de la Langue originelle, parfaite, dont les langues ne seraient que des dégradations; et plus encore, celui, cher au narcissisme spontané — ou théorisé — de la pensée selon lequel notre pensée « pure », avant les mots, avant les autres, est trahie par les mots dont il faut la vêtir pour la communiquer à autrui. Ainsi, derrière la mission de rétablir, dans les faits, la communication, par le moyen du discours la V.S. remplit une autre fonction — visant aussi, mais sur un autre plan, la « cohésion sociale » : pourvoir de nombreux lecteurs d'une représentation confortable de leur position relativement à la science, dans un jeu de communication dont le discours exécute en lui-même les figures. 46

Grundmann & Cavaillé (2000)

• Is simplification misleading in Hilgartner's continuum? 358
• Case study com Descartes no XVII e controvérsia do ozonio no XX
• public communication to as-sume a heuristic role for science. Therefore, scientists’ reaching outto the public has more important implications than being `mere’rhetoric/ In particular, metaphores and graphical representations have been instrumental in this proccess. 380
• In both cases, however, one cannot simply speak of a cynicalmanipulation of the public at large and accuse the scientists of usinga special rhetoric with no link to the work of scienti® c interpretationitself. ... But this intention also implies a projection of the scientistinto this public, because this potential universal destination (even if this universality is only ® ctitious) is inscribed into the very operatingconcept of modern science. In this regard, as we have seen inDescartes’ manner of writing and communicating science, theattempt to simplify is not separable from the methodological demandof simplicity. The same holds true for the atmospheric scientists whoframed the problem in terms that resonated with public perceptions. 

Myers 2003

• Researchers such as those in this issue are likely to question some of the boundaries that have been assumed for popular science. Earlier textual studies tended to fit within what has been called a ‘dominant view’ (Hilgartner, 1990) or a ‘canonical view’ (Grundmann and Cavaillé, 2000) of popularization. This view assumes that there are two separate discourses, one within scientific institutions and one outside them, and that information is translated from one of these discourses to the other. There are several assumptions that go with this view: 
• that scientists and scientific institutions are the authorities on what constitutes science; 
• that the public sphere is, on scientific topics, a blank slate of ignorance on which scientists write knowledge; 
• that this knowledge travels only one way, from science to society; 
• that the content of science is information contained in a series of written statements; 
• that in the course of translation from one discourse to the other, this information not only changes textual form, but is simplified, distorted, hyped up, and dumbed down. (The French term vulgarisation carries even more of this pejorative sense.) It is not surprising that this dominant view of popularization is so prevalent, because it is the view of the process as seen from within scientific institutions, and it is the view promoted by those institutions (e.g. Royal Society of London, 1985). 266
• Especialidade é um conceito dúbio pois as áreas de especialização são muitas e há ainda as "especializações populares". Mesmo membros de uma comunidade precisam de popularização (médicos). 268
• In the dominant view of popularization, a research article (preferably just one) is the ultimate source of undiluted and undistorted science. For some approaches, for instance, bibliometric studies of scientific disciplines, that may be a useful simplification. But discourse analysts must remember that scientific discourse involves a range of genres and practices, and that popularizations are an important part of this range. As Stephen Hilgartner says, ‘popularization is a matter of degree’ (1990: 528). The collection of texts one makes to show ‘specialist’ or ‘popular’ genres may itself be mixed in terms of its audiences, intentions, or register 
• The informal uses of language cannot be ruled out as unscientific; it is in casual talk that the science is done as a practical matter (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Lynch, 1985; Ochs and Jacoby, 2000). Being able to explain one’s project, and its relevance to wider society, in non-specialist terms, or to colleagues, is an essential part of running a large lab and getting further funding. And sometimes it is essential to be able to explain, again in non-specialist terms, why a competing claim about global warming models, vaccination risks, or cold fusion is wrong. Only from the outside, and from a great distance, does scientific discourse seem to employ a single unified register 270
• Just as the dominant view assumes a deficit model of members of the public, it also assumes that the scientific information, when it arrives, is written on the blank slate of public culture. There is no sense in this view of the cultural schemas through which people might make sense of science and make it relevant to their lives, except when these schemas are treated as outmoded common sense, bias, ideology, and ignorance. Yet it is a clear message of history of science, in every period, that science emerges from and enters back into the culture of the period 271
• The dominant model of popularization assumes that the aim of the process is to convey scientific knowledge to a wider audience. As we have seen, some studies measure the process by checking to see whether members of the public know certain facts; if they do not know these facts, they do not know science (for a critique of such studies, see Wynne, 1995). Some scientific institutions also assume that if people knew more about science, their attitudes towards the authority of science in matters of public policy would change: they would be more likely to believe estimates of the risk or safety of nuclear power plants, vaccinations, or skin cancer. But this is clearly not the case; people assess messages about risk in terms of such factors as their trust in the person or institution telling them, its past record, their memory of other, similar issues, and their feelings about how this issue fits with their own experience (Wynne, 1996b, 2001). 273

Secord 2004

• thinking always about every text, image, action, and object as the trace of an act of communication, with receivers, producers, and modes and conventions of transmission. It means eradicating the distinction between the making and the communicating of knowledge. It means thinking about statements as vectors with a direction and a medium and the possibility of response. 661
• If you want a history that truly does the job, the answer is not to invite one contributor to discuss each country separately but to find people willing to study different kinds of interactions, translations, and transformations. 669  
•  Popular science é um termo vazio. 670

Vergara 2008

• vulgarização como termo ruim, aparece em Myers tbm 137-8
• A questão da tradução é uma das características da vulgarização, presente em suas primeiras definições, mesmo em um momento em que o termo “vulgarização científica”, ainda não possuía uma definição dicionarizada. Contudo a tradução inerente ao texto “vulgarizado” tem gerado inúmeras discussões: alguns teóricos percebem esse aspecto como definidor da prática vulgarizadora, como Jacqueline Authier, para quem o texto da vulgarização ou da divulgação seria sempre um discurso derivado de um original, ou seja, o da ciência.9 Nesse sentido se justificaria o papel do vul-garizador como mediador, gerando a imagem do “terceiro homem”. Para outros, como Daniel Jacobi, a vulgarização seria um continuum da comunicação da ciência, complementar à prática científica.10 Em minha opinião, quem melhor resolve essa questão são Michel Cloître e Terry Shinn, que afirmam que a força da vulgarização científica reside em sua capacidade de levar as preocupações sociais para a comunidade científica e atualizar o público das novidades da ciência. Para esses autores, a vulgarização é também um componente da vida do laboratório. Os elementos polissêmi-cos, as representações idealizadas do sujeito e as metáforas desempenham um papel paradoxal importante, mesmo que indiretamente, no desenvolvimento de novos conhecimentos. Libertados das amarras inerentes à exposição para os especialistas, os cientistas se engajam na vulgarização e lá encontram um espaço epistemológico aberto que per-mite formulações e combinações inéditas. Contudo os mesmos autores alertam para o risco de uma vulgarização de pouca qualidade, que pode gerar obstáculos ao não esclarecer com precisão os conceitos e suas relações inerentes ao trabalho científico. 
• oltando a atenção para o verbete de 1813, pode-se perceber a idéia de que no ato de vulgarizar há uma perda da “aura” e deslocamento de valores, o que antes era nobre passa a ser agora plebeu, culminando com a corrupção máxima que seria a prostituição. Para melhor entender essa questão, é importante ver o que significa “tradução”, cujo sentido atual vem da Renascença, quando o verbo traducere foi introduzido pelos humanistas italianos, para designar a “reprodução” do “original” em outro código.12 A missão do tradutor era então de “transladar”, de difundir as obras-pri-mas da antiguidade, de torná-las acessíveis a todos. Segundo George Steiner, a arte da tradução consiste em produzir uma terceira linguagem, que seria a linguagem da humanidade, da compreensão: a tradução seria um instrumento de construção de algo universal.
• o refletir sobre a tradução, vemos que ela está marcada tanto pelo limite da fidelidade a algo anterior a si mesma quanto pelo sentimento de impossibilidade de transmissão integral do sentido em questão. Segundo Paul De Man, “o tradutor, por definição, fracassa. O tradutor nunca pode fazer o que o texto original fez”.14 Mas a tradução também é uma “sobrevida do original. [...] Ela atualiza e transforma o original. [...], o põe em movimento, retirando-o de sua imobilidade”.15 O que Steiner e De Man estão discutindo é a possibilidade ou não de tradução entre todas as línguas, remetendo à imagem mítica da Torre de Babel, quando toda a humanidade perde a possibilidade de comunicação com o surgimento de vários idiomas, originando o caos. Assim temos na tradução a busca de uma língua universal que restauraria a harmonia entre os homens.
• A vulgarização científica do século XIX trazia consigo vários dos elementos enunciados pela tradução: o limite na transmissão dos conteúdos; a preocupação de estar ao alcance de todos e assim conferir um efeito universal ao conhecimento; além de carregar consigo também a centelha do novo. Se isso é verdade, então posso afirmar que a vulgarização ou divulgação é uma atividade criadora, ou seja, faz surgir algo que não existia anteriormente. No caso da vulgarização do século XIX, ela estava anunciando as inovações do mundo da ciência que, a partir daquele momento, fariam parte da cultura letrada, como eletricidade, vacina, telefone, entre outros, mesmo que o seu princípio científico permanecesse pouco conhecido.138-9
• vulgarização  científica  e  a  especialização  das  disciplinas  são  processos  correlatos  ao  longo  dos  oitocentos, erigindo fronteiras entre o que era ciência ou não. Assim, surgiu a necessidade da figura do vulgarizador, cujo papel de “tradutor” viabilizou a construção de uma forte confiança na ciência junto ao público. À medida que a sociedade acei-tasse a idéia geral de que o trabalho do cientista é desinteressado e que este está sempre em busca do bem comum, o apoio da sociedade para a atividade científica deveria ser incondicional e a ciência se desenvolveria, segundo seus critérios de auto-regulamentação, independentemente da opinião pública, justificada por seu aspecto utilitário. 142
• Para apaziguar essa insatisfação com o progresso científico e tecnológico surge o vulgarizador, buscando traduzir a linguagem utilizada pelos cientistas para a do homem comum, de um nível da mesma língua a outro. Como já foi dito anteriormente, a vulgarização passa a ser, dessa maneira, o meio pelo qual a ciência, escrita em uma linguagem específica, pode ser expressa em uma linguagem comum. 143
• Creio que há um equívoco ao entender a dimensão de tradução como sendo produto de um discurso hierarquicamente inferior, desqualificando o trabalho do divulgador e não considerando sua atividade como criadora. Assim, ao considerar o discurso divulgador como mais permeável a outros discursos, se comparado ao texto científico tout court, posso admitir que existe uma conexão entre público e cientistas, pois estes teriam acesso às demandas e expectativas sociais, que em alguns casos pode influenciar as diretrizes da pesquisa científica. ..... a divulgação é um paradoxo, sendo ao mesmo tempo necessária e carregando em si algo de impossível – uma vez que há instâncias da ciência que seriam “intraduzíveis” para todos.144
• Para contextualizar as conferências
• Para os historiadores, a análise dos textos de vulgarização é uma fonte de uma riqueza inesgotável, pois eles são mais permeáveis aos demais discursos da sociedade do que o texto científico strictu senso. Assim podem-se ver outras informações que estavam sendo veiculadas juntamente com o conhecimento científico, contribuindo para que possamos entender vários aspectos do contexto da produção daquele texto. Também nos ajuda a ver até que ponto esse esforço vulgarizador viabiliza a inclusão da ciência na cultura num sentido mais amplo. 139 (ver tbm 141)
• A institucionalização da ciência se desenrolou ao longo do século XIX e visava a profissionalização dos cientistas e a garantia de sua autonomia e auto-regulamentação, frente ao Estado e à sociedade. Esse processo postulava a instrução sistemática e a nítida separação entre leigos e especialistas, criando o ethos da comunidade científica. ... No Brasil, esse processo não ocorre nas universidades, que só surgirão no século XX, mas em espaços como o Observatório Nacional, Museu Nacional, Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Comissão Geológica do Império, Jardim Botânico, entre outros.40 Apesar da aparente pulverização desses “lugares de ciência” na sociedade brasileira, eles tinham em comum a produção de uma imagem de “cientistas desinteressados”, além de conferir um valor à ciência como algo intrinsecamente bom para a sociedade. Couty apontava a vulgarização como um meio de convencimento da sociedade para legitimar a prática científica: “Foi com esses meios de vulgarização que pouco a pouco se estabe-leceu na Europa a geral corrente científica, que eu desejava ver no Brasil. Foram tais sociedades e sobretudos aqueles diferentes jornais e revistas que levaram a toda a parte o gosto pelos estudos científicos e o conhecimento de sua utilidade. Deve-se, pois, evidentemente recorrer a iguais meios para conduzir o Brasil ao mesmo fim. 142
• Vulgarização já em uso no Br de 1870, dicionarizado depois, provavelmente vindo da Fr 140
• Aumento literário 141-2
• Vulgarização para colocar cc como assunto, não para representar perfeitamente seu conteúdo 143

Daum 2009

• Problemas terminológicos
• ideal types that would serve as universal categories open enough to structure empirical observations without equating the language of historians with the language of their sources. Undoubtedly, these terms are of limited use if we test their logic: Is popular science only science popularized or something more and different? What does “popular” mean? Can we still speak of “science” if “scientific” knowledge transforms into something very different—with respect to its reach, validity, and interpretation— once it is being consumed as a public good? 320
• Imbalances
• emphasis on science; emphasis on anglo-saxon development; emphasis on the xix century 322
• "natural history ... was deliberately construed and promoted as a field of popular interest" 324 (ver Drouin e Bensaude-Vincent 1996)
• "Poland, a country in which about 30 percent of all popular sciencevpublications at the time were translations." 326
• Heuristic categories 328-31
• Transformation over time and causality; Actors and agency; Practices, Markets and consumption; Presentation and performance; Authority and meaning [DA]; communication and transfer across borders

Topham 2009

• Science as communication breaking down the distinction between scipop and sci proper. O conceito tem história e varia muito. Ponte entre campos. Core element of sci as communication. 1-2
• Science for the people/science of the people 2-3
• Secord
• a shift of focus to consider ‘science as a form of communicative action – to recognize that questions of “what” is being said can be answered only through a simultaneous understanding of “how,” “where,” “when,” and “for whom”’.9 This approach, which Secord dubs ‘knowledge in transit’, reinscribes the formerly marginal field of science popularization/popular science as a core element of a reconceptualized history of science and has important consequences for historical practice. To begin with, by ‘eradicating the distinction between the making and the communicating of knowledge’, it focuses attention on how science popularization contributes to the project of science as a whole. 4
• O que fazer com a perda da categoria popular science? 5
• Historicizar os termos. Início bem marcado a partir do xix 6-7
• Morag Shiach e Topham - Comercialização editorial aliada a popularização (interessante pro Origin). 8
• Sobre exclusionismo
• "Such uses of the notion of ‘the popular’ to exclude non-specialists from knowledge production and render them passive consumers have clearly been common for many years. However, they do not exhaust the range of possibilities. Nor should we assume that exclusionary uses predominated or even necessarily existed when the language of ‘popular science’ was first introduced in the preprofessional age." 12
• The use of the epithet ‘popular’ to make science sell, whether in printed form or in exhibitions, lectures and museums, is clearly distinct from the exclusionary usage identified by Hilgartner. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the commercial usage can contribute to the exclusionary when ‘mere popularizers’ are represented as having distorted science in order to sell it. Conversely, however, many of those engaged in commercial ventures of popularization in early nineteenth-century Britain had mixed motives – wishing to make a living, but also committed to an inclusive ideology of science. ... Inducement to scientific practice 13
• Popular science as part of science in Rudiwick e também em Fleck 16
• "Historical studies of science popularization still often fail to challenge the notion inherited from the diffusionist model, that this is a form of communication between a unitary body of scientists on the one hand and an undifferentiated lay public on the other. Of course, closer study reveals a range of intended audiences being addressed, and a range of often unintended usages being developed." [trad pode ajudar aqui] 18
• "the various activities conceived of as ‘science popularization’ at different periods and in different places cannot be detached from the rest of the practice of science as the diffusionist model implies that they can" .... remoção da carga difusionista 19
• Science popularization é um termo muito diverso pra ser útil
• In its place, I have suggested the need to develop an approach in which all scientific knowledge is understood as part of a communicative process, involving appropriation, resistance and cultural contestation. This has the benefit of reintegrating ‘science popularization’ with other forms of communication in science, including education and international communication, and it also provides a range of new historiographical resources, drawn from, among other places, the cultural history of the book, translation studies and the history of education. 19-20

Bensaude-Vincent 2009

• O que é único na ciência enquanto forma de comunicação (a tension between the need to provide a larger conceptual framework in pursuing historical studies of science and the ambition to focus on what is unique in science communication and what is specific to each historical period and each science)? 
• Porque a categoria popsci é desconfrotável? 359-61
• Deficit and participatory model 361
• Linda síntese da coisa toda 362-3
• Trad
• ". In their attempt to “translate” the language of experts for laypeople, mediators have tended to consider the public as a passive audience, made up of consumers of science and technology" 362
• Political turn (citizen science) 364
• !!!
• How might we reconceptualize the issue of science popularization? Given that the notion of “popularization” and related notions such as “lay public” and “science mediators” are historical constructions rather than stable categories, a pluralistic historiography that would not separate legitimate science from alternative popular knowledge is called for. [...]. Historical studies should seek a better understanding of how the demarcation between what is viewed as legitimate science and nonlegitimate knowledge has been generated and how it is endlessly renegotiated. Bearing in mind that science is a normative activity, in competition with other forms of knowledge, we should focus on the various processes of marginalization, exclusion, and disqualification. As I have argued elsewhere, from the beginnings of Western science in ancient Greece a clear border has been drawn between science and common knowledge, between epistemeˆ and doxa. 19 The demarcation line is not a by-product of scientific activity; it is, rather, a foundational gesture. The involvement or the exclusion of laypeople is a key ingredient that shapes not only valid scientific methods but also the goals of scientific endeavors. In other words, if we want to understand the changing identities of science, we have to take into account the changing configurations of its “others”: the lay public, amateur practitioners, charlatans, pseudoscientists, and the like. The history of science should no longer be isolated from the history of the public’s attitude toward science. The public is not a passive spectator of scientific advances, it is volens nolens the partner of scientific enterprise. Most historians of science do not even suspect that the notion of “the public” has its own intricate history that intertwines political and commercial as well as cultural and scientific dimensions. We should consider the co-production of science and its “others” in the longue dure´e. Historical epistemology requires historical “doxology” (the historical study of opinions and popular knowledge) as a counterpart. 365-6
• Popular science is a transient and contingent notion, characteristic of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century science that saw scientific practices gradually confined into academic spaces and thus configured the “public” as passive spectators or users of its products. This notion cannot be extrapolated either to earlier periods (when amateur practices of science were legitimate) or to more recent history (when technoscience is open to the market and permeates our daily life). The recent “paradigm shift” in the relation between science and the public reminds us that science does not hold the monopoly on knowledge in a society. It is always competing with rival forms of knowledge. Whether they are labeled as opinions or superstitions or prejudices, these alternative forms of knowledge contribute to shaping the methodological rules of scientific activity. Taking into account that popular science is just one distinct configuration of the distribution of knowledge in society, I suggest that we include this historical category within a broader research agenda: how science, as a normative activity, continually defines itself with regard to its “others” and thus asserts its authority and prestige. 367
• Historians of science have so far focused mainly on the process of production of scientific knowledge. We know a lot about the social construction of knowledge; but what do we know about the construction of society through the hegemonic status of scientific knowledge? In order to characterize the “regimes” of knowledge production in the past, we have to focus on the process of the mutual construction of legitimate science and “popular knowledge.” Once we acknowledge that their interaction is a working hypothesis suggested by the recent shift here described—from the deficit model toward the participatory model—we have to test the hypothesis against a number of local case studies before any general conclusion can be inferred. We still need more local studies attentive to the variety of cultures of science—from the most academic to the least orthodox—in any period of time. How did they interact? Did they learn from each other, ignore each other, or criticize each other? In particular, how, when, and in what circumstances was a clear boundary established between science producers and science transmitters (teachers as well as popularizers)? On the peripheries, how did Western science gain its authority and prestige by disqualifying indigenous science in colonial contexts? Concerning the critics of science, in the nineteenth century—as Katherine Pandora rightly points out—the phrase “popular science” did not necessarily mean “lower” or “lesser” science. In some cases, popular science was promoted as an alternative science amid strong criticisms of academic science. Yet while such antiacademicism was as vigorous in science as it was in the fine arts, it has been eclipsed and disqualified rather than celebrated by posterity. There is no evidence that the strategies of discrimination and exclusion underlying the claims for scientific authority were the same over time and everywhere. It is therefore important to conduct comparative studies of various processes of discrimination among competing forms of knowledge. History of science in general will benefit from a better understanding of the “others” of science. 367-8

Gavroglu 2012

• shift the emphasis from a diffusionist model to the view that historians should study the circulation of knowledge and the multifarious ways that such circulation brings about a sense and consciousness of what is science, what is scientific and what is scientificity. Thus, popularization has been freed from being considered a well defined, specific and restricted form of a scientific genre and its characteristics are now considered as being perpetually present in almost every form of scientific activity. 224
• Local 225
• Ideologia 225
• Popularização como "elaboração política e apropriação social da autoridade da ciência". Tecnocracia 226
• Reducionismo  deixou de ser técnico e se tornou ideológico. 228
• "European" science 229
• Conclusão
• There are, in a way, two kinds of ideologies involved in the process of popularization: One is the ideology expressed by the very act of popularization, by the enterprise to popularize itself. The second kind is the ideology imbedded in what is being popularized, in the kind of science that is being popularized, in the appropriate discourse used for the popularization of science. And I wanted to emphasize that though the first kind, that which is expressed by the act of popularization is rather clearly manifested and easily discernible, the second one, which has to do with the content of what is being popularized is usually opaque and almost always neglected. Of course, the hegemonic ideology does not involve a static and unchanging set of values. It needs continuous revamping since a particular ideology needs to be reinforced in order to be lasting. Popularization, or rather the ideology of popularization, is one such means. And, thus, the popularization of ideology, affects in turn the ideology of popularization 230

Esteves 2014

• Narra a popularização grega calcada em Montgomery dos compiladores.
• Arato de solos como tradutor intralinguistico popularizador com os versos (Montgomery 2000 28). 90-2
• Depois fala da popularização romana.
• Então chegamos onde mais nos interessa
• À medida que mais pessoas foram tendo acesso à instrução e à cultura em geral, fez-se necessária a criação de materiais textuais que “fizessem a ponte” entre as descobertas e discussões de teóricos profundamente envolvidos em uma complexa rede de conceitos e ideias e o público mais leigo. Em certo sentido, o livro didático é uma forma de popularização, já que, por exemplo, inicia não cientistas nos meandros da ciência. A tradição do manual, que discutimos anteriormente, também tinha como um de seus propósitos o ensino e a divulgação de conhecimentos que antes ficavam restritos a um pequeno grupo de especialistas. 95-6
• Cornelis e analogia entre popularização com um mapa em escala, o mapa perfeito é inútil porque é imenso. Já usa o termo tradução.Tem a interpretratação do popularizador e do leitor 97-8 Aproximações
• “Ainda assim, a popularização parece ser possível” lembra igualmente as discussões sobre a impossibilidade teórica da tradução contraposta à sua existência empírica. Outras expressões como “o mínimo de distorção possível” e “compensar a perda implicada pela tradução” também ajudam a aproximar as duas práticas textuais. 98
• Há outro aspecto da divulgação científica que se parece com a tradução: muitas vezes, há um limite para o que é transmitido. Poderíamos chamar esse ponto insondável de “umbigo da tradução”, numa singela homenagem a Freud. 99
• Paradigmas de Kuhn como tradução 100
• Impossibilidade de tradução devido a limitações do leitor leigo. 100-1
• Instaura-se o paradoxo. O livro é para leigos, porém tem mais chances de ser traduzido corretamente se quem fizer a tradução for um não leigo. 103
• Tornando a intralingual (tradução com conotação de perda)
• Em seu artigo, Mueller cita um trabalho de Hilgartner, de 1990, que discute um caso de distorção de dados publicados em periódicos científicos e depois divulgados pela grande mídia. Trata- -se de um texto publicado por dois epidemiologistas britânicos que apresentaram uma revisão sobre estudos das causas evitáveis de câncer. O problema é que, no artigo que foi publicado para cientistas, havia tabelas com altos graus de variação, e os autores fizeram observações e ressalvas sobre essa variabilidade e a qualidade dos resultados. Quando o texto foi reproduzido pela grande mídia, essa variabilidade foi ignorada, e esses dados inexatos foram usados em documentos governamentais, relatórios de institutos científicos, artigos na área jurídica e legal, panfletos sobre dietas e publicações de grupos ativistas (Mueller, 2002). É preciso, portanto, atentar para o modo como a popularização científica é feita. O fato de cidadãos comuns serem parcialmente “analfabetos” em termos científicos exige que os que são alfabetizados na área tenham um código de ética que guie seu trabalho de popularização. Isso se aplicaria também para o caso de programas e livros sensacionalistas, como apontado por Cornelis. 105-6
• Questão da fusão a frio também como exemplo 108.
• Depois fala de tradução na renascença baseada em Burke. 108-111

Machado 2014

• Difere a trad cc em trad automatiza e cc traduzida. Essa última por sua vez é divida em literatura cc traduzida (interlingual), divlugação (intralingual) e produção de conceitos (intersemiótica). 240
• .... traducão intralingual, Segundo Jakobson, esse tipo de traducao caracteriza- se por ser produzida na mesma lingua, por meio de outros signos, Nesse caso, trata-se de traduzir para uma linguagem menos técnica, ou seja, para um público mais amplo e leigo, ou neófito, aquilo que é produzido pelas comunidades cientificas, Em qualquer banca de jornal ou livraria encontramos exemplos de publicações de divulgação e educacão cientifica, que também podem ser traduzidas de maneira interlinguistica, Historicamente, ha varios exemplos de tradução como divulgagao/educagaocientifica.
• tbm cc cidadã
• Os Estudos da Traducao,neste ponto, podem fazer ume Composi¢ao coma Divulgacio Cientifica, a Historia da Ciencia e* Educacio, areas que tambéminteressam aos Science Studies. 242
• Também cita Kuhn como trad intersemiótica 242-3

Hochadel 2020

• Long duree: 1) science in e out; 2) disputa por recursos; 3) entretenimento 68

Exemplos práticos

• Muñoz-Miguel 2012, Rizzo 2015 (especialmente a partir de 241), Wermuth e Verplaetse (2018), Bania e Faridy 2021

FALTA: Shapin 1984; Shapin 1990; Wright 2011; Simões et al 2012

 La Science Populaire dans la Presse et l’Edition XIXe et XXe siécle (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1997); Bernard Schiele and Daniel Jacobi (eds.), 

Vulgariser la Science: le Procès de l’Ignorance (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1988); 

Ana Simões, Ana Carneiro and Maria Paula Diogo, ‘Riding the Wave to Reach the Masses: Natural Events in Early Twentieth-century Portuguese Daily Press’, Science & Education 21(3) (2012), 311–33;