Krein-Kühle (2003); Wierzbicka (2004); Dines (2008); Beullens (2008); van Oppenraay (1999); Kruk (1999);

 Krein-Kühle (2003)

• For the purpose of this thesis, a translation is defined as the interlingual transposition of a source text into a target text based on the invariance requirement of ST sense/intended sense or 'das Gemeinte' (2.2.1) and involving an interpretation of the ST against the background of factual knowledge (e.g., domain knowledge, encyclopaedic/world knowledge, etc.) underlying the ST. Since scientific and technical STs may be defective (Schmitt 198Th; Horn-Hell 1999), scientific and technical translation may therefore be understood as to include corrections, e.g., to remedy ST flictual inaccuracies, or well-motivated minor revisions, omissions or additions (such as a translator's footnote), but to exclude any revisions, omissions or additions that go beyond the level of sense/intended sense or 'Gemeinte'. It is the sense/intended sense or 'Gemeinte' that is common to both ST and TT and has to be replicated and kept invariant in translation and will function as the tertium 29 comparationis in our translation comparison (2.2.1). This intended sense has a double nature, being simultaneously a text-internal and a text-external invariant, since, e.g., in the case of defective STs, the sense has to be established by the translator via replication of author intentions against the background of factual domain knowledge and encyclopaedic or world knowledge underlying a specific text 29-30
• An overview of the concept as it is perceived in the literature of STT has shown that very early approaches to equivalence (Jumpelt 1961, see 1.2.1, Pinchuk 1977, see 1.2.2 ) remain restricted to the grammatical, lexical or, at most, syntactic levels. This is not surprising, since, at the time, translation was considered to be a branch of applied linguistics, and theoretical/descriptive frameworks to account for the complex phenomenon of translation had not yet been developed. Nonetheless, these very early approaches must be given credit for detailed and clear-sighted analyses (here, in particular Junipelt's (1961) analysis based on the application of the procedures of modulation and transposition) and for already pointing out the need to consider, e.g., texttypological aspects, domain-related context, situation and reader orientation as prerequisites for successful scientific and technical translation. More recent approaches to the concept (Sager 1993, Horn-HeIf 1999) involve a splitting of equivalence into various types, which may, however, be viewed as yet another contribution to the proliferation of equivalence types rather than a help in clarifying the concept itself Apart from the terminological confusion arising from Sager's (1993) (1.2.3) discussion, the main problem with his somewhat unstructured approach to equivalence lies in his attempt to apply the concept to his extended 36 definition of translation, which implies a lack of delimitation of the concept of translation from other forms of text (re)production as a prerequisite for dealing with equivalence. Such a demarcation is also missing in Horn-Hell's (1999) (1.2.4) ST - defectiveness-based reconsideration of the concept. The unsystematic and erratic defectiveness of STs cannot be regarded as a legitimate basis for a clarification of the equivalence concept. The basic problem with Horn-Hell's approach is the attempt to reconcile the theoretical concept of equivalence with aspects that go beyond translation proper, such as her claim to give the translation agency a "theoretical" [sic!] slot in the translation process (op. cit.:96) and the client priority over the ST (o  p. cit. :295). 35-6
• As the etymology of the term has shown, equivalence is not about sameness or identity but about being of equal value. In the translation context, this implies that 37 we have to define the factor (or factors) to be kept invariant in translation, ie., the tertium comparationis, in relation to which equivalence is aimed at. 36-7
• In our view, the translational relation between an ST and a TT does not say anything about the quality of this relation. Translation quality, however, is the direct indicator of achieved equivalence. Therefore, equivalence is regarded here as a qualitative complete-text-in-context-based concept. It refers to the translational relation between a complete source text and a complete target text, both of which are embedded in a specific domain-related context, and implies the preservation of ST sense/intended sense or 'das Gemeinte' (the invariant) (2.2.1) in the TT using TL linguistic means, the best possible selection of which must have been achieved at the syntactic, lexical-semantic, terminological-phraseological, and textual levels. These levels are hierarchically interrelated and subject to pragmatic aspects (2.2.1). 38

Wierzbicka (2004) - Semantics of Natural Kinds (p. 335-350). In: Semantics: Primes and Universals. Oxford University Press, 2004.

• Para Wierzbicka, há um dicionário mental acessado pela linguagem que registra o conhecimento folk e uma enciclopédia mental acessada pelo conhecimento científico. A semântica dos nomes dos organismos é diferente do conhecimento sobre eles.
• Ela não acredita nas semelhanças familiares da linha de pensamento convencionalista (portanto mais alinhada ao nominalismo) de Wittgenstein. Ela acredita que os limites dos termos são bem distintos.
• None the less, although the tacit knowledge implicit in words such as mouses or crocodile is quite extensive, it can be seperated, in a non-arbitrary way, from encyclopaedic knoledge about mice or crocodiles; and there are some types of information about denotata which can never become part of the folk concept (e.g. information about the average weight, in grams or kilograms, of a particular kind of animal) 336
  
• According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry reproduced above, mouse is an "imprecise term" which doesn't correspond exactly to any biological taxon. In natural language, however (that is, in ordinary English), it is not felt to be any less precise than folk genera such as horse, rabbit, or squirrel. /P/ The scientific category Mus musculus does not correspond to the folk categorization reflected in the concept 'mouse': in everyday English "the common house mouse" (Mus musculus) is not thought Of as a specific variety of a wider category "Mus", and the expression "house mouse" is not used at all. because it is precisely the "house mouse" which is normally called "mouse", with "field mice" or "white mice" being seen as horizontal exten- Sions of the basic category (see Bright and Bright 1969; Hunn 1976; Berlin 1977), not as Other varieties, on a par with "house mice". /P/ Thus, the folk concept 'mice' stands for what ordinary people see as a 'kind of creature', different from scientific categories and identifiable in terms of its name call them MICE'), and of its presumed nature ('they are all Of the same kind'); a nature which cannot be fully reduced to any verbal descriptions but which has something to do with their reproduction ('they come from creatures of the same kind'). 343
• Enciclpédias apresentam componentes usados na definição dos termos que não são os mesmos utilizados pelo conhecimento popular, inclusive ela omite certos pontos culturais e pragmáticos vitais para a definição popular. Em um dicionário cultural, haveria o registro do que é linguísticamente e psicologicamente importante, ao contrário da enciclopédia.
• Dicionários incorporam conhecimento e pseudoconhecimento estabelecendo fatos psicoculturais finitos e definíveis. Enciclopédias passam por escolhas arbitrárias de seleção de conteúdo, mas visam apresentar fatos científicos selecionados de um corpus acumulativo e infinito.
• Systematic, methodical exploration Of folk concepts, using all available avenues of evidence, allows us to delineate their contours with a precision which, appearances to the contrary, is simply inaccessible to an ency- clopaedia entry. The editor Of an encyclopaedia has to decide, in an inevitably somewhat arbitrary manner, what to include from the mass Of available information and what to ignore, how to arrange the information chosen, which aspects of it to highlight, and so on. In investigating folk concepts encoded in natural language, the position is quite different, because the linguist is not faced with the task Of choosing what to include; here, the task consists in discovering the full concept as it really is, using all available evidence. and, at the same time, trying to use exclusively sim- Pler (much simpler) concepts than the one which is being explicated. These two requirements—to articulate the concept fully, and to do it as far as pos- Sible in simple words—mean that far less room is left for individual choices than in an encyclopaedia entry. 347
• Há uma certa dose de indeterminação nos conceitos populares relacionada ao conhecimento de cada um, mas ela não é definitiva.
• The fact that different languages draw such boundaries in different ways demonstrates that these boundaries can indeed be drawn. For example, if Japanese doesn't distinguish lexically between mice and rats, or English between clothes moths (in Polish, mole) and other moths (in Polish, émy), this shows that semantic boundaries between different living kind concepts do exist, and that they are different from those drawn by biologists. /P/ Haiman's claims that "all science is ethnoscience" (1982: 337) and that "the difference between everyday experience and scientific experience is a difference in degree of precision and generality" do not affect the present argument: the question is not how to draw the line between science and ethnoscience, or between cultural knowledge and linguistic knowledge, but how to draw the line between knowledge and ideas which are encoded in language and knowledge and ideas which are not. 349
• Exploring the lexicon [cuja estrutura reflete os "domínios cognitvos" que organizam o conhecimetno na mente] in a systematic and methodical way we can dis-cover how "ordinary people" (in contrast to experts and scientists) con-the world; and we can learn to discern the line which separates language-related everyday knowledge from the specialist's knowledge, which is—or should be—largely language-independent. 350

Wierzbicka (2004) - Semantics and Ethnobiology (p. 351-376). In: Idem.*

*O texto saiu inicialmente como What's in a life form: conceptual issues in ethnobiology. J. Linguistics Anthropology, 2(1), 3-29, 1992.

• Wiezbicka não acredita no taxon "life form" de Berlin et al. Acredita que ocorre muita confusão entre os sentidos popular e científico dos termos.
• Ela prefere utilizar evidências linguísticas para atingir as classificações subconscientes ao invés de questionários. Os tipos de evidência são:
• Ways of referring: Não se chama árvores de planta comumente, nem girinos de sapo ou lagartas de borboleta [há aqui uma ligação com os semaforontes]. Inconscientemente caem em classificações distintas.
• Grammatical congruity: segundo Wierzbicka, existem supercategorias não taxonômicas. Um jeito de identificá-las é através de substantivos contáveis e não contáveis (para ela é impossível que um porco seja um tipo de gado, já que podemos contar porcos mas não "gados" normalmente). Isso é explicado melhor em Wierzbicka (1984):
• If words such as furniture or cutlery imply a variety of kinds rather than any one kind of thing, what is it that holds these different kinds together? Surely, the different kinds of things that can jointly be called furniture (or cutlery) must have something in common if they can be combined under the same lexical label. In the case of concepts such as toy or weapon, the common denominator consists in a common function. I argue that collectiva such as furniture or cutlery are also defined partly, though not exclusively, in terms of func- tion. For example, cutlery is used to eat with; crockery is used to put food on (or in); fur- niture is used to make houses more comfortable to live in; clothing is used to cover the body and/or to keep it warm; jewelry is used to adorn the body; and so on. /P/ The collective concepts embodied in singularia tantum such as crockery or furniture im-ply more than a unity or similarity of function. I argue that they also imply a unity of place. Presumably, this is why they are "collective concepts": they stand for collections of things kept together (for a similar purpose). More precisely, they stand for things of different kinds that occur as groups, or collections, of things of different kinds kept together in one place. For example, a furniture factory does not necessarily produce collections of things; it sim- ply may produce things of different kinds (such as tables, sofas, chairs). But these things of different kinds are expected to be used in heterogeneous groups, including, for example, a table, a sofa, and several chairs, all put in the same place (such as a room). /P/ The crucial importance of place as a unifying principle on which these categories are based is sometimes quite transparent. For example, kitchenware includes things of different kinds used jointly in the kitchen; tableware, things of different kinds put jointly on a table and used jointly; bedlinen, things of different kinds put jointly on a bed; clothing, things worn on the body; underwear, things worn on the body under other things worn on the body. Some concepts of this kind presuppose a unity of time in addition to the unity of place. For example, nightwear includes things of different kinds worn jointly at night (to bed); schoolwear, things of different kinds worn jointly to school; and ski gear, things worn and used while skiing. 319/320
• Morphological structure: as vezes sinônimos tem significados distintos de acordo com o contexto. 
• Considerations of this kind support the significance of the distinction between "secondary lexemes" (such as blue spruce or scrub oak) and "primary lexemes" (whether analyzable, such as tulip tree, or unanalyzable, such as poplar or elm) drawn by Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven (1973).  8 (357?)
• Phraseological evidence: como o nome do organismo é usado em expressões cotidianas revela sua categorização subconsciente.
• Lexical evidence: Análise de palavras.
• The fact that English has numerous nouns for kinds of dogs (e.g., poodle, spaniel, boxer, and so on), but no nouns for kinds of cats or kinds of mice, suggests that the two domains are conceptualized differently. (One can say, of course, "I have a Siamese," as one can say "I have a spaniel," but one can also say "I have a Siamese cat" but not *"I have a spaniel dog.") Moreover, it suggests that the domain of dogs, and not that of cats or mice, involves a special level of taxonomic categorization: subgenus (see Brown 1987; Wierzbicka 1985:232-236). Roughly speaking, a word such as poodle or spaniel identifies a certain kind of dog, whereas an expression such as blue whale, white mouse, silver fox, or bush turkey identifies a kind of animal (namely, whale, mouse, fox, or turkey) and differentiates some subset, or quasi-subset, of the class of animals from other possible subsets. This distinction between positive identification and differentiation, whose importance was first pointed out by Berlin et al. (1973), is reflected in a number of ways in linguistic usage (Wierzbicka 1985). It is also often reflected in diachrony, since a cultural change may lead to a change in conventional conceptualization, and hence to a linguistic change, such as the change from Alsatian (adj.) dog to Alsatian (noun). 9 (357/358?)
• Politipicidade é mais útil em identificar life forms.
• Critica a mistura de terminologia científica e popular.
• Scientific concepts such as mammal stand for classes, not for individuals, and it is remarkable that although educated speakers of English are, so to speak, bilingual (in "scientific English" and in "folk English"), and can mix elements from both in their speech, none the less they unconsciously apply different rules to them and in particular do not use scientific concepts such as mammal with reference to individual creatures: [...] 359
• Mammal, quadruped, carnivore, animal (no sentido técnico) seriam todos conceitos científicos não existentes na folk classification inglesa. Palavras populares são aprendidas por "ostention" quando criança enquanto os termos científicos não.
• Acredita que animal não é um unique beginner devido ao seu uso frasal, mas creature é uma opção melhor pelo mesmo motivo.
• Casos mais complicados como spider, snail, ants, bats... podem ser generics isolados, uma vez que não são life forms semanticamente por não serem lexicamente politipicos (os lexemas secundários vão direto para specifics).
• Tree é a unica life form botânica bem reconhecida. Vine, bush etc não são (seriam quasi-life forms). Flower pode ser ´life form, mas também pode ser PART dependendo do contexto.
• Quando a classificação é utilitária, a taxonomia não é mais importante psicologicamente.
• Plant não pode ser unique beginner, pois designa apenas mudas verdes [olha o semaforonte aí de novo]. Dificilmente chamariam uma árvore de planta em um contexto informal. Assim, Wierzbicka usa o a categoria covert "things that grow out of the ground".
• Raças de cães, por não serem lexemas secundários e outros testes são colocadas em uma nova categoria por Wierzbicka, subgenric. Seria uma categoria expressiva para taxa de importância cultural.
• Hidden natures or essences:
• Atran (1987a) links the greater "fuzziness" of artifactual concepts with a lack of presumption of "hidden natures" or "underlying essences." I have argued, however, that life forms don't carry such a presumption either. The presumption of "hidden natures" is a characteristic feature of folk generic concepts, not of all natural kind concepts. The "fuzziness" of artifactual supercategories is explained, I believe, by the fact that they are not taxonomic. Biological supercategories, such as tree or bird, are not "fuzzy," not because they imply some "hidden nature," but because they stand for "kinds of things" ("superkinds") rather than for heterogeneous collections, groups, and so on. 22

Dines (2008) - THE TEXTUAL AND PICTORIAL METAMORPHOSES OF THE ANIMAL CALLED CHYROGRILLIUS (p. 73-89) In: GOYENS, Michèle; DE LEEMANS, Pieter; SMETS, An (eds.). Science translated: Latin and vernacular translations of scientific treatises in medieval europe. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008.

• For some unknown reason, the word shafan [Procavia capensis] was translated as xoirogrúlliov, literally a ‘grunting pig’. This word is very rare and as far as I know, it does not appear in earlier Greek literature. Most likely, it referred to a hedgehog (echinos) or a porcupine (akantachoiros); at least, this is how the term was explained in the fifth century AD by Hesychius of Alexandria, the composer of the largest dictionary of rare words3. We find an analogous interpretation in the dictionary of the Byzantine lexicographer Suidas, who lived in the tenth century4. In fact, the word chirogrillus was incomprehensible at the time of the Septuagint translation; this is demonstrated by the fact that in the famous Codex Alexandrinus (codex a)5 the occurrence of shafan in the Psalms is translated as lagóv, a hare6. This translation may be due to the proximity of these two animals, the shafan and the hare, in Leviticus and Deuteronomy. Perhaps the author of the Codex Alexandrinus considered them to be similar animals. The Syro-Hexapla, an early seventh century translation of Origen’s third century work, translates the occurrence of shafan in the Psalms by representing it as two animals, the chirogrillus and the hare, probably in an attempt to reconcile these two readings7.
• Muitas outras traduções seguiram, com confusão de Jerônimo misturando os animais, tradução por crocodilo, ouriço e coelho.

Beullens 2008. ARISTOTLE, HIS TRANSLATORS, AND THE FORMATION OF ICHTHYOLOGIC NOMENCLATURE. p. 105-122. Mesmo livro acima.

• Even if Aristotle’s achievement was formidable, Georges Cuvier in his Histoire des sciences naturelles, posthumously published in 1841, sharply formulated its principal shortcoming9
• Comme tous les naturalistes anciens, Aristote semble avoir cru que les noms, par lesquels on désignait de son temps les animaux, ne changeraient jamais, et il se borne presque toujours à nommer les espèces, sans en faire la description. Il en résulte qu’il est extrêmement difficile, dans beaucoup de cas, de reconnaître les animaux qu’Aristote dénomme.
• Precisely this aspect often challenges the creativity of modern translators. How, then, did their medieval and renaissance counterparts tackle the problems posed by this very specific vocabulary?
• Terminologia cresce com viagens e com a introdução de espécies em outros lugares. Muitas termos são retirados de outras línguas. 109
• George de Trebizond, em 1450 diz: 
• Since that man (viz. Aristotle) names almost uncountable animal species and describes their own characteristics, what did I do while translating, as I frequently did not know about which he spoke? I collected everything I read in the writings of the Latin authors and I daily looked for more. I perceived many things with conclusive evidence from the characteristics, as, e.g., Aristotle says of the male fishes of the glanis species, that if they come across their young brood, they immediately halt for the defense of their brood and do not go from there until the young are of age to care for themselves. I found in the Latin authors that ‘siluri’ exactly do this. I therefore did not hesitate and put ‘silurus’ in all places where in the Greek the ‘glanis’ fish is named. Furthermore, we modeled many terms according to the meaning of the words and we did not do it without model, as several Latin authors call a ‘belone’ ‘acus’ and ‘erythini’ ‘rubeoli’, modeling Greek words in Latin. As in some cases neither procedure could conveniently be applied, we put the Greek words themselves, often slightly modified to fit the Latin form.’ 110 nota 19
• Trebizond used three different strategies in his search for an adequate ichthyologic vocabulary. First, he searched the ancient Latin authors for corresponding characteristics [notably Pliny] [...] Trebizond’s second choice was to create new words with analogous etymologies. [...] Finally, when other methods failed, Trebizond left room to transcribe Greek terms in Latin characters and adapt the inflection. 111-2
• [Sobre Gaza] These authors were the sources of his translations into Latin, which was a foreign language for him. If he introduced new or Greek words, he wanted them to sound familiar and close to the Latin practice, as for those words that either were generally used in Latin, as ‘delphinus’ or ‘camelus’, or for which there was no Latin equivalent readily available, as for the freshwater fish ‘balerus’. In some cases, one should not even despise the vernacular30 113 nota 30 abaixo
• ‘He names the animal species according to the use of antique and canonized authors. If he assigns a new name, he inserts it so that it could also look familiar and related. If he names something in Greek, it does not sound harsh. For it must either be commonly used and, so to speak, widely spread among the Latins, as are the words ‘delphinus’, ‘camelus’, ‘elephas’, ‘crocodilus’, ‘ichneumon’, ‘aspis’, ‘salamandra’, and others similar, or sound so that it seems to be no less Latin than Greek… Who would think that by naming that doubtful animal ‘latax’ or the river fish ‘balerus’, one sounds foreign? Sometimes not even the vernacular should be despised.’
• [Embora ele consultasse muito Plínio] There are other cases where Gaza clearly challenged the authority of the Latin authors. Following Trebizond, he identified the ∂lloc with the Latin ‘accipenser’, although Pliny explicitly states that, according to Ovid, the ‘helops’ is unknown in Mediterranean waters, which shows that those who think it is the same as the ‘acipenser’ are mistaken35. Gaza held even more reservations against the Greek manuscripts of Aristotle’s text, which, he felt, were corrupted during their transmission. Therefore, he did not hesitate to emend the text whenever he judged it necessary. As he probably was unaware of the existence of the fishing-frog, he consistently considered the word bátraxov as a corruption of bátov in those passages that clearly implied a fish and not an amphibian, and thus translated it as ‘raia’36. 114
• One of Gaza’s main objections to the work of his predecessors was their incompetent invention of new names. Yet, it is precisely in this area that he definitely outdid Trebizond37. 114
• As a final example, the translation pedigree of the ôrfóv is very instructive. Moerbeke transliterated the term, but used vernacular renderings as well, demonstrating that he had a particular fish in mind38. Trebizond handled the word with observable difficulty. He first omitted the word from his translation, leaving a mark in the margin, later transliterated it on three occasions and once made a marginal note of the Greek word39. Gaza introduced the term ‘cernua’, which may well be an implementation of his warning not to despise the vernacular: in some Italian regions, the ôrfóv was known as ‘cerna’40. 115
• Hermolao Barbaro, pupilo de Gaza também fica em um vai e volta entre correção e seguir textos antigos. Dava valor ao vernacular na hora de traduzir os nomes das espécies.
• [Paulo]  Giovio underpinned his search for the correct identification of Roman fishes by listing the species names in Roman, Ligurian, Etruscan, Venetian, French, and Spanish vernaculars. Later scientific writers often borrowed precisely these elements from his work. Interestingly, Giovio also conjectured about the particular value of the Spanish language, which, according to him, preserved many uncorrupted elements from the Latin language47. 118
• Dicionários da década de 1550
• Salviani’s work in particular demonstrated. It opened with a series of synoptic tables, listing the species’ names in Greek, Latin, and vernacular, its attributes, and the relevant quotations in Aristotle, Oppian, Pliny, Athenaeus, Aelian, and various authors. According to the preface, references to Aristotle were to the books and chapters from Gaza’s Latin version. 120
• Conrad Gesner inspirou-se em Gaza para cunhar seus termos ictiológicos.
• Peter Artedi, já no século XVIII, não é muito influenciado por Gaza.
• Linnaeus binary ichthyologic nomenclature, as it was established in the tenth edition of his Systema naturae57, was greatly influenced by Artedi’s work, as he testified in the preface: ‘Synonyma ab Artedio petenda’. Linnaeus preserved several traditional names, sometimes combining Greek and Latin elements for binary combinations as in the case of the ‘Xiphias gladius’ or the ‘Silurus glanis’. Besides, there also exists a ‘Perca cernua’. If the hypothesis is right that Gaza imported the word ‘cernua’ from the vernacular into Latin, one of his neologisms may still live on in contemporary ichthyology. 121

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