Resumos 3
Por que e como escrever histórias da tradução?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-7968.2021.e75706Palavras-chave:
História da Tradução, Historiografia da Tradução, Metodologia em História da TraduçãoResumo
Tradução para o português brasileiro do artigo “Why and How to Write Translation Histories?”, de Lieven D’Hulst, publicado originalmente em inglês na edição especial da Revista Crop (v. 6, São Paulo, 2001) dedicada à história da tradução no Brasil. Retomando o hexâmetro mnemônico utilizado pela retórica clássica para abordar a oratória - quem (quis); o que (quid); onde (ubi); por quais meios (quibus auxiliis), por que (cur); como (quomodo); quando (quando) - e aplicando-o especificamente à história e à historiografia da tradução, D’Hulst aponta o que pode/deveria ser abordado por essa área dos estudos da tradução. Traduzir este artigo implicou também um trabalho de edição. Sendo o texto de abertura da referida edição especial, o autor faz menção a vários de seus artigos como exemplos de pesquisas realizadas; optamos por transferir tais menções para as notas de rodapé com o objetivo de conferir maior fluidez ao texto no contexto de uma nova publicação.Foundations of ArtScience: Formulating the Problem
Foundations of Science 26, 225–244 (2021)
Abstract
While art and science still functioned side-by-side during the Renaissance, their methods and perspectives diverged during the nineteenth century, creating a still enduring separation between the "two cultures". Recently, artists and scientists again collaborate more frequently, as promoted most radically by the ArtScience movement. This approach aims at a true synthesis between the intuitive, imaginative methods of art and the rational, rule-governed methods of science. To prepare the grounds for a theoretical synthesis, this paper surveys the fundamental commonalities and differences between science and art. Science and art are united in their creative investigation, where coherence, pattern or meaning play a vital role in the development of concepts, while relying on concrete representations to experiment with the resulting insights. On the other hand, according to the standard conception, science seeks an understanding that is universal, objective and unambiguous, while art focuses on unique, subjective and open-ended experiences. Both offer prospect and coherence, mystery and complexity, albeit with science preferring the former and art, the latter. The paper concludes with some examples of artscience works that combine all these aspects.
Is Truth the Gold Standard of Inquiry? A Comment on Elgin’s Argument Against Veritism
Foundations of Science 26, 275–280 (2021)
Abstract
In True enough, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017), Elgin argues against veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elgin’s argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elgin’s argument fails as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. Just as one can aim at gold medals and still find approximations to gold, such as silver and bronze medals, to be acceptable and honest achievements in competitive sports, one can aim at full truths as the paramount epistemic objective and still find approximations to truth, such as models and idealizations, to be acceptable and honest achievements in scientific inquiry.
Superorganisms of the Protist Kingdom: A New Level of Biological Organization
Łukasz Lamża
Abstract
The concept of superorganism has a mixed reputation in biology—for some it is a convenient way of discussing supra-organismal levels of organization, and for others, little more than a poetic metaphor. Here, I show that a considerable step forward in the understanding of superorganisms results from a thorough review of the supra-organismal levels of organization now known to exist among the “unicellular” protists. Limiting the discussion to protists has enormous advantages: their bodies are very well studied and relatively simple (as compared to humans or termites, two standard examples in most discussions about superorganisms), and they exhibit an enormous diversity of anatomies and lifestyles. This allows for unprecedented resolution in describing forms of supra-organismal organization. Here, four criteria are used to diferentiate loose, incidental associations of hosts with their microbiota from “actual” superorganisms: (1) obligatory character, (2) specifc spatial localization of microbiota, (3) presence of attachment structures and (4) signs of co-evolution in phylogenetic analyses. Three groups—that have never before been described in the philosophical literature—merit special attention: Symbiontida (also called Postgaardea), Oxymonadida and Parabasalia. Specifcally, it is argued that in certain cases—for Bihospites bacati and Calkinsia aureus (symbiontids), Streblomastix strix (an oxymonad), Joenia annectens and Mixotricha paradoxa (parabasalids) and Kentrophoros (a ciliate)—it is fully appropriate to describe the whole protist-microbiota assocation as a single organism (“superorganism”) and its elements as “tissues” or, arguably, even “organs”. To account for this level of biological complexity, I propose the term “structured superorganism”.
Keywords Superorganism · Holobiont · Protista · Symbiontida · Oxymonadida · Parabasalia
Kuhn and the Contemporary Realism/Antirealism Debates
Thomas Kuhn was never a key player in the contemporary realism/antirealism debates, the debates that gained momentum around 1980 or so, with the publication of Bas van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image and Larry Laudan’s “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” But I argue that Kuhn had a significant influence on these debates. Kuhn played a significant role in focusing philosophers’ attention on a different issue than the realism/antirealism debates of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of focusing on the meaning of theoretical terms, philosophers of science turned their attention to the problems raised by changes of theory. The particular shape of the contemporary debates thus owes something to the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Nineteenth-Century Scientific Practice
Abstraction and generalization are two processes of reasoning that have a special role in the construction of scientific theories and models. They have been important parts of the scientific method ever since the nineteenth century. A philosophical and historical analysis of scientific practices shows how abstraction and generalization found their way into the theory of the logic of science of the nineteenth-century philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Our case studies include the scientific practices of Francis Galton and John Herschel, who introduced composite photographs and graphical methods, respectively, as technologies of generalization and thereby influenced Peirce’s logic of abstraction. Herschel’s account of generalization is further supported by William Whewell, who was very influential on Peirce. By connecting Herschel’s scientific technology of abstraction to Peirce’s logical technology of abstraction—namely, diagrams—we highlight the role of judgments in scientific observation by hypostatic abstractions. We also relate Herschel’s discovery-driven logic of science and Peirce’s open-ended diagrammatic logic to the use of models in science. Ultimately, Peirce’s theory of abstraction is a case of showing how logic applies to reality
French Neopositivism and the Logic, Psychology, and Sociology of Scientific Discovery
This article is concerned with one of the notable but forgotten research strands that developed out of French nineteenth-century positivism, a strand that turned attention to the study of scientific discovery and was actively pursued by French epistemologists around the turn of the nineteenth century. I first sketch the context in which this research program emerged. I show that the program was a natural offshoot of French neopositivism; the latter was a current of twentieth-century thought that, even if implicitly, challenged the positivism of first-generation positivists such as Comte. I then survey what French epistemologists—including Ernest Naville, Élie Rabier, Pierre Duhem, Édouard Le Roy, Abel Rey, André Lalande, Théodule-Armand Ribot, Edmond Goblot, and Jacques Picard, among others—had to say about the logic, psychology, and sociology of discovery. My story demonstrates the inaccuracy of existing historical accounts of the philosophical study of scientific discovery.
Motivating the History of the Philosophy of Thought Experiments
The literature on thought experiments has been steadily expanding since 1986. And yet, it appears that several aspects of the philosophical conversation have recently stalled. We claim that the current philosophical literature has much to gain by a reappraisal of its origins: by identifying the historical contingencies that caused the contemporary discussion to take the shape it has, we will be in a better position to entertain other directions the current debate could go, identify and eliminate mistaken dogma, and revive forgotten insights. This special issue of HOPOS is an attempt to start such a conversation, and we hope it might inspire similar pursuits in the history of the philosophy of other scientific methods like modeling, experiment, and computer simulatio
The Annus Mirabilis of 1986: Thought Experiments and Scientific Pluralism
This article is about the remarkable explosion in the literature on thought experiments since the 1980s. It enters uncharted territory. The year 1986 is of particular interest: James R. Brown presents his Platonism about thought experiments for the first time in Dubrovnik, and in Pittsburgh, John D. Norton shares his empiricist approach with participants in what was probably the twentieth century’s very first major conference on thought experiments. It was the time when philosophy of science had taken a pluralistic turn, and the article develops the notion that this is a key factor in the outburst of discussions about thought experiments in the 1980s.
Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments
The history of the philosophy of thought experiments (TEs) has touched on the work of Kuhn, Popper, Duhem, Mach, Lakatos, and other big names of the twentieth-century. But so far, almost nothing has been written about Paul Feyerabend. His most influential work was Against Method, eight chapters of which concern Galileo, with a significant focus on Galileo’s TEs. The later Feyerabend was interested in what might be called the epistemology of drama, including stories and myths. This article brings these aspects of Feyerabend’s work together in an attempt to present what might have been his considered views on scientific TEs. According to Feyerabend, TEs are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and instigate a new one through the use of propaganda to change our habits, by appealing to our sense of what is interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent, and surprising. I conclude by contrasting Feyerabend’s ideas with two currents in the modern debate on TEs: (1) the claim that the epistemology of TEs is just the epistemology of deductive or inductive arguments and (2) the claim that a complete epistemology of TEs must take into account the fact that TEs are a kind of narrative
Historical Counterfactuals, Transition Periods, and the Constraints on Imagination
The history of how philosophers have dealt with thought experiments in science is the main focus of this special issue. Counterfactual analysis is an interesting feature of thought experiments, because it requires the imagination of alternative states of the world (see also publications by Fearon, Lebow and Stein, Reiss, and Tetlock and Belkin, who suggest the same). In historical analysis, the use of imagination is often the focus of criticisms of such counterfactual analysis. In this article, I consider three strategies for constraining imagination: making limited counterfactual changes, limiting counterfactual changes to decisions of important figures, and using evidence to restrict the scope for imagination. Given the focus of this special issue, I will relate this discussion to Lewis’s and Woodward’s analyses of counterfactuals in the philosophy of science. I show that counterfactual analysis in historical cases has some resemblance to Lewis’s and Woodward’s analyses, but that what Lewis calls “transition periods” cannot be left entirely vague, as Lewis suggests, nor can counterfactual changes be seen simply as interventions, as Woodward suggests. I propose that efforts to limit imagination in historical counterfactuals are ultimately problematic, but that imagination can nevertheless play a useful role in counterfactual analysis.
Scientific knowledge production and economic catching-up: an empirical analysis
Scientometrics 126, 4565–4587 (2021)
This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the production of scientific knowledge and level of income for a panel of 56 countries during the period 1996–2015. We argue that the accumulation of scientific knowledge is a key factor for the enhancement of educational and technological capabilities within an economy, and hence may have a positive impact on GDP per capita levels. We use academic publications in refereed journals (in all areas and specifically in engineering) as a proxy of scientific performance. As regards the impacts of scientific performance, we distinguish between high- and middle-income countries and, among the latter, between Asian and Latin America. The results show that academic publications are consistently and positively correlated with income per capita, for both middle and high-income countries. We also find non-linear effects in both groups. Those effects are lower for middle-income countries suggesting the presence of decreasing returns on academic performance. Finally, while Asian countries benefited from specialization in engineering research, no such effects were found for their Latin American peers.
Do senior faculty members produce fewer research publications than their younger colleagues? Evidence from Ph.D. granting institutions in the United States
Scientometrics 126, 4659–4686 (2021)
Abstract
The aging of the professoriate throughout the end of the twentieth century and the early years of the 2000′s (both before and after the end of mandatory retirement in the United States, ca. 1994) has become a source of concern for some scholars and research administrators, who posit that the “greying” of the academy results in lower research activity and a decline in scientific advancement. Some published opinions concur that senior scholars’ research programs do not keep pace with those of their younger colleagues, but little quantitative evidence has been presented to evaluate that claim. In this study, we quantify senior faculty publication activity in six broad fields, comparing their publication rates to their younger colleagues across four modes of knowledge dissemination: journal articles, conference proceedings, books, and book chapters. Career publication activity does not follow the “peak and decline” pattern described in earlier studies. In most fields, journal article publication rates do not decline substantively with age (and in some cases article publication rates are higher among senior scholars), conference proceeding publication rates tend to decline with age, while book and chapter publication rates increase markedly with age. Overall, senior scholars maintain publishing activity levels and tend to shift their focus to the development and evolution of ideas through the publication of longer-format works as books and book chapters
The journal coverage of Web of Science, Scopus and Dimensions: A comparative analysis
Scientometrics 126, 5113–5142 (2021)
Abstract
Traditionally, Web of Science and Scopus have been the two most widely used databases for bibliometric analyses. However, during the last few years some new scholarly databases, such as Dimensions, have come up. Several previous studies have compared different databases, either through a direct comparison of article coverage or by comparing the citations across the databases. This article aims to present a comparative analysis of the journal coverage of the three databases (Web of Science, Scopus and Dimensions), with the objective to describe, understand and visualize the differences in them. The most recent master journal lists of the three databases is used for analysis. The results indicate that the databases have significantly different journal coverage, with the Web of Science being most selective and Dimensions being the most exhaustive. About 99.11% and 96.61% of the journals indexed in Web of Science are also indexed in Scopus and Dimensions, respectively. Scopus has 96.42% of its indexed journals also covered by Dimensions. Dimensions database has the most exhaustive journal coverage, with 82.22% more journals than Web of Science and 48.17% more journals than Scopus. This article also analysed the research outputs for 20 selected countries for the 2010–2018 period, as indexed in the three databases, and identified database-induced variations in research output volume, rank, global share and subject area composition for different countries. It is found that there are clearly visible variations in the research output from different countries in the three databases, along with differential coverage of different subject areas by the three databases. The analytical study provides an informative and practically useful picture of the journal coverage of Web of Science, Scopus and Dimensions databases.
The Matthew effect impacts science and academic publishing by preferentially amplifying citations, metrics and status
Scientometrics 126, 5373–5377 (2021)
Abstract
The fame or status of an academic might not be built exclusively on research merit alone. In a world of competitive publishing, where vanity, metrics and citations play key roles in academics’ survival, for better or for worse, journal or institutional prestige may also serve as catalysts to further promote their status. The Matthew Effect, which breeds success from success, may rely on standing on the shoulders of others, citation bias, or the efforts of a collaborative network. Prestige is driven by resource, which in turn feeds prestige, amplifying advantage and rewards, and ultimately skewing recognition.
Researchers’ attitudes towards the h‑index on Twitter 2007–2020: criticism and acceptance
Mike Thelwall1 · Kayvan Kousha1
Abstract The h-index is an indicator of the scientifc impact of an academic publishing career. Its hybrid publishing/citation nature and inherent bias against younger researchers, women, people in low resourced countries, and those not prioritizing publishing arguably give it little value for most formal and informal research evaluations. Nevertheless, it is well-known by academics, used in some promotion decisions, and is prominent in bibliometric databases, such as Google Scholar. In the context of this apparent confict, it is important to understand researchers’ attitudes towards the h-index. This article used public tweets in English to analyse how scholars discuss the h-index in public: is it mentioned, are tweets about it positive or negative, and has interest decreased since its shortcomings were exposed? The January 2021 Twitter Academic Research initiative was harnessed to download all English tweets mentioning the h-index from the 2006 start of Twitter until the end of 2020. The results showed a constantly increasing number of tweets. Whilst the most popular tweets unapologetically used the h-index as an indicator of research performance, 28.5% of tweets were critical of its simplistic nature and others joked about it (8%). The results suggest that interest in the h-index is still increasing online despite scientists willing to evaluate the h-index in public tending to be critical. Nevertheless, in limited situations it may be efective at succinctly conveying the message that a researcher has had a successful publishing career.
Keywords H-index · Twitter · Research management · Research evaluation · Twitter academic research
The right to refuse unwanted citations: rethinking the culture of science around the citation
Jaime A. Teixeira da Silva · Quan‑Hoang Vuong
Abstract Logically, and by most common standards, academics would be pleased to be cited, considering it a form of recognition of their intellect. In return, especially those with high citation counts, such as Clarivate Analytics’ Highly Cited Researchers, can beneft through peer recognition, rewards, funding, securing a better position, or expanding a collaborative network. Despite known and untold benefts, one issue has not been discussed: the right to refuse to be cited or the right to refuse a citation. Academics might not want to be cited by papers published in truly predatory journals, papers with false authors, or sting papers with falsifed elements that employ underhanded ethical tactics. Currently, academics generally have the freedom to select where they publish their fndings and choose studies they cite, so it is highly probable that requests to remove citations or refuse citations might never become formal publishing policy. Nonetheless, this academic discussion is worth having as valid and invalid literature increasingly gets mixed through citations, and as the grey zone between predatory/non-predatory and scholarly/unscholarly becomes increasingly difcult to distinguish.
Keywords Author- and journal-based metrics · Citation boosting and manipulation · Predatory publishing
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